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ABSTRACT
Debate exists about how much alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) is
used in courts and about the metrics by which to evaluate its impact. Yet on two
measures—the volume of rulemaking and the privatization of court-based
interactions—the results are unambiguous: courts have promulgated hundreds of
rules governing ADR, and those rules rarely protect rights of the public to know
much about either the processes or the results. Rather, court-based procedural
rules are increasingly becoming contract-promoting rules, encouraging parties
to conclude disputes without adjudication.
In this essay in honor of Professor Stephen Subrin, I explore the centrality of
“open courts” to judicial legitimacy. Courts provide opportunities for democratic
engagements with the production and application of law. The public’s right of
access to observe proceedings in courts sustains judicial independence,
legitimates public investments in the judiciary, and offers routes to oversight
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when courts fail to live up to obligations to treat disputants fairly. These
constitutional values ought to inform the shape of procedural innovations in
courts. Court-based arbitration and court-based settlement programs, like courtbased trials, should be regulated to reflect the constitutional obligations to
provide a role for the public.
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PROCEDURAL ASPIRATIONS

What makes an institution a court, and what makes a procedural system
legitimate? The answers are neither atemporal nor apolitical but embedded in
changing practices of adjudication and in interpretations of the constitutional
obligations of judges.
These contingencies, along with the dynamism and the vulnerability of
courts, are at the center of this essay, honoring Stephen Subrin for his
leadership in exploring the norms of procedure. In his 1999 article, On
Thinking About A Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure,1 Professor
Subrin identified the central “values and goals” of the procedural system in the
United States. His requirements (in this order) were that a procedural system
resolves disputes “peacefully”; that it does so efficiently; that it fulfills
“societal norms through law-application”; that it provides an “accurate
ascertainment of facts” and “predictability”; that it “enhanc[es] human
dignity”; that it “add[s] legitimacy and stability to government and society”;
that it “permit[s] citizens to partake in governance”; that it aids in “the growth
and improvement of law”; and that it works by “restraining or enhancing
power.”2
Given his focus on the United States, Subrin’s analysis implicitly addresses
the attributes of a procedural system in a democracy built on citizensovereignty as well as on the need for dispute resolution. In light of
1

Stephen N. Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of a Country’s Civil Procedure, 7
TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 139 (1999) [hereinafter Subrin, On Thinking About a Description of
a Country’s Civil Procedure].
2
Id. at 140.
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democracy’s commitments to egalitarian opportunities for participation in the
body politic and to the constrained and accountable exercise of government
power, specification of another attribute—publicity—is in order.3 That term,
borrowed from Jeremy Bentham,4 represents ideas which became central to
American political thought and to courts’ procedures as state and federal
constitutions welcomed and protected public access to open courts.
To analyze the roles played by the public, I first sketch the history of the
development of the norm of publicity and its instantiation in the United States
through constitutional texts insisting on open courts. These provisions protect
two kinds of access rights—for potential claimants and for third parties, free to
attend and observe proceedings. As I explore, an important relationship exists
between publicity in courts and the qualities of courts that merit describing
them as democratic. Thereafter, I examine the ways in which state and federal
procedural systems, focused on trials in courthouses, once made public
observation relatively easy, reducing the need for much reflection on the law
and theory undergirding such practices.
Second, I turn to twentieth-century procedural reforms, which facilitated
claimants’ access to courts and yet contributed to the reshaping of judicial work
in a fashion that has come to undercut the role played by the public. In terms of
the aspect of open courts welcoming claimants, the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were door-opening, as they simplified ways to file lawsuits and
expanded techniques for gathering information. Yet the 1938 Rules also posed
a challenge to the other aspect of open courts—the capacity of third parties to
participate through direct observation. By creating a pretrial phase focused on
lawyer-judge meetings, the Federal Rules led the way for the development of a
litigation system in which trials became rare and key interactions took place
outside the courtroom.
Nonetheless, the 1938 Rules also provided new routes for the public to
gain insights into, and to participate in, norm development. The Rules’
innovative system of forced-information exchanges through reciprocal
obligations of discovery generated insights into a host of government and
corporate activities. The 1966 revisions facilitating class actions enabled
aggregation of various kinds of claims and, in conjunction with common law
and statutory fee-shifting rules, supported an expansion of the plaintiffs’ bar.
The litigations that the Rules helped to spawn generated a wealth of public

3

See JEREMY BENTHAM, Constitutional Code, in 9 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 41
(John Bowring ed., 1843); FREDERICK ROSEN, JEREMY BENTHAM AND REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY: A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CODE 26–27 (1983); Anthony J. Draper,
‘Corruptions in the Administration of Justice’: Bentham’s Critique of Civil Procedure,
1806–1811, 7 J. BENTHAM STUD. 1 (2004).
4
See JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827), 6 THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM 351–80 (John Bowring ed., 1843) [hereinafter BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial
Evidence].
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information, as the materials filed in court were presumptively available for
public review.
Government-subsidized adjudication and the authority to bring claims
render courts redistributive. Procedural reforms in the twentieth century
augmented the resources of all kinds of disputants (be they corporate
defendants or employees, prison officials or prisoners) by easing access and
facilitating the exchange of information. Litigants who had limited resources
before entering the marketplace of law benefitted enormously from the
constitutional, statutory, and rule developments that provided new routes to
court and new rights in court.
Conflicts about the role to be played by courts ensued, illustrating the
redistributive impact of open courts and how courts can function as a means of
sparking public debates about the uses and limits of law. Reformers with
diverse agendas pressed for refashioning rules. Some sought to respond to the
volume of claimants by augmenting the methods for pursuing alleged violations
of rights, for example through class action reforms. Others aimed to curb the
capacity of individuals and groups to be claimants.
Beginning in the 1980s, procedural revisions pushed significant aspects of
court-based dispute resolution out of sight. The Federal Rules were amended to
provide that discovery materials were no longer routinely filed in courts unless
appended to motions, and pre-discovery confidentiality agreements became
routine.5 Other amendments promoted various modes of “alternative dispute
resolution” (“ADR”), including settlement conferences, mediation, and courtannexed arbitration. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure once posited ADR as
an “extrajudicial” activity, pursued by the parties or through referrals to
mediators outside the courthouse. But the revisions of the 1980s and 1990s
brought ADR in-house. New mandates put judges to work promoting and at
times participating in various forms of ADR.
To be sure, there is much to fix in courts, which ought not to be idealized
or posited as the sole path to or the embodiment of justice.6 Entry barriers are

5

See generally Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery
Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181 (2014). This article surveyed cases on the sharing of
information obtained in discovery, the use of “return-or-destroy” provisions required as a
predicate either to discovery or to settlement, and a relaxed standard for granting protective
orders of disclosures made. Benham called for rules building in the sharing of discovery as
part of the goal of increasing the efficiency of litigation. He argued that his proposals fit the
paradigm of Federal Rule amendments addressing proportionality as a test of the permissible
scope of discovery. Id. Members of Congress have proposed, but not obtained enactment of,
obligations to make more materials available. See, e.g., Sunshine in Litigation Act of 2014,
S. 2364, 113th Cong. (2014).
6
See HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW
148–66 (1999); Gillian K. Hadfield, Innovating to Improve Access: Changing the Way
Courts Regulate Legal Markets, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 83, 83 (“The vast majority of
ordinary Americans lack any real access to the legal system for resolving their claims and
the claims made against them.”).
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significant,7 and the judicial process can be used to work unfairness. Illustrative
is one study of 4,400 lawsuits filed by debt buyers in Maryland courts;
unrepresented debtors regularly defaulted on amounts owed (averaging about
$3000), all processed through courts that did not insist on judicial oversight or
inquiries to check on the documents proffered.8 Courts are also the source of
debt, as their user fees and fines can produce cycles of payments due, and even
imprisonment for contempt of court as a result of nonpayments.9 The pains that
courts can inflict became vivid in Ferguson, Missouri, as detailed in the 2015
Department of Justice account of how the municipal court in Ferguson10
worked in tandem with the police to maximize the locality’s revenues through
“constitutionally deficient” procedures that had a racially biased impact.11
One lesson from Ferguson is the importance of public insight into the
processes of courts. Documentation of the failures comes in part because of
court obligations to maintain records and to permit public observation—
opening paths to correct injustices, if popular will to do so exists.12 Thus, the
developments of so many rules privatizing the exchanges between judges and
disputants in ordinary civil litigation requires exploration of a third topic: the
role of the public in ADR.
Ferreting out ADR’s relationship to the public proves to be difficult
because the rules of ADR rarely identify obligations to the public. Reviews of
hundreds of provisions at the local levels in federal and state courts, as well as
interviews with court staff, were required to understand the place of the public
in ADR.13 What that research demonstrates is that, to the extent rules address
7

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, for example, precludes
many employees and consumers from participating in class actions or going individually to
court; instead, these potential claimants are required to use dispute resolution systems
stipulated in job application forms or in documents accompanying purchases or the use of
credit cards. See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration,
the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015) [hereinafter
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes].
8
Peter A. Holland, Junk Justice: A Statistical Analysis of 4,400 Lawsuits Filed by Debt
Buyers, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 179 (2014). Ninety-eight percent of the defaulting
debtors lacked counsel. Id. at 208–09.
9
See ALICIA BANNON, MITALI NAGRECHA & REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 13–26 (2010),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Fees%20and%20Fines
%20FINAL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/J3AR-KRU2.
10
CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 42–62 (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa
/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/9EKY-NS43.
11
Id. at 42, 68–69.
12
The breaches in Ferguson included the court’s failure to make public all it was required to
do. Id. at 97–98.
13
My understanding has deepened as a result of the thorough research of a group of
students, who combed rules and called clerks’ offices as we tried to ferret out the ways in
which ADR rules deal with public access. See Memorandum from Mark Kelley, Chris
Milione & Devon Porter to Judith Resnik, Court-Annexed Arbitration (Apr. 28, 2014)
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the public or third parties, the purpose is generally to ensure confidentiality. As
currently practiced, ADR makes most of its processes and outcomes
inaccessible. Even as ADR takes place inside courthouses, it is generally
outside the public purview and it displaces public adjudication.
The fourth issue is the import of the law and history of public adjudication
to court-based ADR. The constitutional framework for public access to courtbased activities stems from First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as
well as from clauses in state and federal constitutions establishing the judicial
branch and from common law traditions. The U.S. Supreme Court has
articulated a presumption of openness for criminal trials and related activities,
such as voir dire. The Court has not expressly decided rights of the public to
observe civil litigation, but lower courts have read the Court’s precedent to
require access to civil litigation analogous to that accorded for criminal
litigation. The Court’s approach, predicated on the First Amendment, invokes
historical experiences of courts as public venues and the values of the resulting
public exchanges, understood in Benthamite terms as instilling confidence and
providing accountability.14 Judges describe the analysis as a mix of
“experience” (practices over time) and “logic” (the claimed benefits of
openness or closure).15
ADR complicates this doctrinal approach. ADR shifts the experiences in
courts and justifies privacy as useful to reach agreements that, when predicated
on consent, are argued as vitiating the need for accountability to third parties.
As closed ADR procedures become the modality of judges in civil litigation,
courts lose their capacity to serve as one of many venues constituting the public
sphere and facilitating debates about law’s reach. Instead, courts turn into
dispute resolution systems largely shielded from public oversight and
competing for filings with private sector providers.16
The difficulty with courts remitting decision-making to private ordering in
a neo-liberal fashion is that it undermines the unique form of state authority
that courts provide. Judges gain legitimacy from being embedded in public
exchanges as they exercise the power to direct the reallocation of property and
the reorganization of families as well as to impose limitations on liberty. Courts
are “a huge information system—an entity that receives, processes, stores,
[hereinafter Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration] (on file with the
author); Memorandum from Michael Clemente, Mark Kelley, Jonas Wang & Benjamin
Woodring to Judith Resnik, Confidentiality, ADR, and Local Rules (October 1, 2014) (on
file with the author). Thereafter, we returned to confirm information with many courts, and
Bonnie Posick reviewed the local rules.
14
See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 507–08
(1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571–72 (1980). See generally
BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 4.
15
These terms appear in many decisions. See, e.g., Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine,
733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014); N.Y. Civil Liberties
Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 298–99 (2d Cir. 2011).
16
See also Resnik, Diffusing Disputes, supra note 7 at 2806–54.
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creates, monitors, and disseminates large quantities of documents and
information.”17 Substantive law and the values of procedural rights are being
effectuated, applied, engaged, undermined, or ignored in dispute resolutions
based in courts—with and without adjudication.18 If third parties have no
access to the processes and the impact of judges’ actions (whether they are
working in their roles as mediators, managers, or adjudicators), the rationales
for judicial legitimacy, independence, and for significant public subsidies to
courts weaken.
Therefore, when courts require disputants to participate in court-based
settlement programs and court-based arbitration in the hopes that both will
obviate the need for court-based trials, courts ought to shape public dimensions
for these alternatives. As bargaining becomes a requirement of the law (rather
than an activity in its shadow), judges need to take responsibility for the
resulting agreements. The denouement of lawsuits, shepherded by judges
pressing for accords to disputes, are not the equivalent of negotiated contracts
created by parties seeking each other out to generate mutual benefits. As the
rules of procedure turn into a set of practices promoting contracts,19
constitutional regulation must follow to insist on a role for the public so as to
protect the opportunities courts provide for democratic engagements with the
production of law and to justify the independence of judges and the authority of
and resources devoted to courts.
II. THE CHANGING “VALUES AND GOALS” OF OPEN COURTS
The custom of open adjudicatory processes has a long history. Roman law
conceived of criminal proceedings as “res publica”—a public event.20
Centuries later, as cities developed, dispute resolution was one of the basic
functions of government; indeed, some argue the formation of cities in
Medieval times stemmed from the need to deal with conflicts so as to facilitate
commerce and provide a modicum of peace and security.21
17

RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LEGAL SERVICES
201 (2008).
18
The role of adjudication in information production is central to Louis Kaplow’s article,
Information and the Aim of Adjudication: Truth or Consequences?, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1303
(2015).
19
See Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005).
20
See BRUCE W. FRIER, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN JURISTS: STUDIES IN CICERO’S PRO
CAECINA (1985); J.A. CROOK, LEGAL ADVOCACY IN THE ROMAN WORLD (1995).
21
See, e.g., Mario Sbriccoli, Legislation, Justice and Political Power in Italian Cities,
1200–1400, in LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE 37, 42–44 (Antonio Padoa-Schioppa ed., 1997).
Sbriccoli traced the movement in the thirteenth century toward an inquisitorial posture that
displaced private ordering (“vendettas, duels, and private alliances”) with “ ‘reasons for
(public) justice’,” such that justice became “one of the criteria by which the effectiveness of
government power was measured.” Id. at 49–50; see also Clive Holmes, The Legal
Instruments of Power and the State in Early Modern England, in LEGISLATION AND JUSTICE,
supra, at 269–89.
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Local rulers of various kinds regularly displayed their authority to make
and enforce rules through public performances of their adjudicatory powers.
But their processes relied on conceptions of judges, litigants, and the public that
were very different than those in democratic polities. Then, judges were styled
loyal servants of the states, subject to kingly (and godly) rule, rather than
independent actors entitled to pronounce judgment on behalf of the state.
Litigants depended on the grace of rulers to be eligible to participate in courts,
and not all persons were authorized to bring suits, to testify, to serve as
professional or lay judges, or to assert claims for protection of their person and
property. In contrast to the modern notions that each person is a juridical equal
and that the state is obliged to subject itself to scrutiny, the point of open
procedures then was to impress on viewers the power of the state to compel
obedience to its edicts.
Yet even in eras before popular sovereignty, public procedures produced
complex interactions between the public and the state. Executions offer one
such example, illuminating not only the capacity of the state to enforce its laws
through dramatic punishments,22 but also the potential for spectators to exercise
power as well. In England, executions “lurched chaotically between death and
laughter” amidst carnivalesque atmospheres that undermined the “script” of a
solemn ritual of state authority.23 Mikhail Bakhtin saw large crowds producing
“the suspension of all hierarchical rank, privileges, norms, and prohibitions.”24
Given the tumult, hangings could only take place “with the tacit consent of the
crowd.”25 One way to control the crowds was to relocate the act of punishment,
moving it from city squares to prisons, offstage and outside the purview of the

22

In seventeenth-century Amsterdam, for example, the burgomasters staged the ceremony
in which death sentences were pronounced in a ground floor room opened to onlookers, who
were able to watch through windows of the Town Hall; executions followed thereafter out
front. Katharine Fremantle, The Open Vierschaar of Amsterdam’s Seventeenth-Century
Town Hall as a Setting for the City’s Justice, 77 OUD HOLLAND 206, 208 (1962).
23
Thomas W. Laqueur, Crowds, Carnival and the State in English Executions, 1604–1868,
in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY: ESSAYS IN ENGLISH HISTORY IN HONOUR OF LAWRENCE
STONE 305, 309–311 (A.L. Beier, David Cannadine & James M. Rosenheim eds., 1989)
[hereinafter THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY]. Laqueur examined graphic prints displaying the
carnival-like atmosphere, suggesting that “from the audience’s perspective, executions were
a species of festive comedy or light entertainment” with a theatricality that came to be
parodied. Id. at 323–25. England was not unique in this regard. See generally SAMUEL Y.
EDGERTON, JR., PICTURES AND PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE
FLORENTINE RENAISSANCE (1985).
24
MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS WORLD 10 (Hélène Iswolsky trans., 1984).
25
Laqueur, supra note 23, at 352. Public executions stopped in England in the late 1960s,
and by 1965, the United Kingdom effectively abolished capital punishment itself. See
Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act, 1965, c. 71 (Eng.). Yet, as Foucault pointed out,
the authority had already shifted its sites of operation. Governments cut out the crowds by
incarcerating individuals in prisons removed from the public. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE
AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 7–8 (Vintage Books 2d ed., Alan Sheridan trans.,
1995) (1977).
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public. That form of privatization, as Michel Foucault identified, expanded
state power while escaping popular oversight.26
Despite the vividness of execution scenes, scholars of the English legal
system point out that “many more people of all ranks of society . . . came into
contact with the legal system through the civil rather than the criminal
courts.”27 The expansion of commerce, coupled with the growth in
governments’ administrative activities and of the legal profession, brought
increasingly diverse people into court. Just as spectators at executions
responded, the audience watching court proceedings developed views about the
legitimacy of the processes and of the decisions made.
In the eighteenth century, the shift to popular sovereignty, exemplified by
the French and American Revolutions, profoundly altered the expectations of
courts and the obligations of judges. A return to Jeremy Bentham, who was
formulating his thoughts on public participation in the early part of the
nineteenth century, is thus in order. Bentham conceived of adjudication as a
robust check on state authority. Deeply concerned about the self-interested
actions of common law judges and lawyers, Bentham argued that publicity
provided several benefits. A first was that, when the public was present, judges
presiding at trial would themselves be “under trial.”28 Thus, as Michel Foucault
later explicated, with public oversight comes the disciplinary power of
surveillance.29
Second, the immediacy of an audience would, Bentham thought, also turn
judges into teachers and courts into “schools” as well as “theaters of justice.”30
Bentham assumed that judges would want to explain their actions to the
audience, who would learn why and how judgments were made. These
26

See FOUCAULT, supra note 25. The contemporary prison reform effort comes in part from
the publicity produced from efforts to “stop solitary” confinement and to respond to violence
inside prisons. See, e.g., AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF TEX., A SOLITARY FAILURE: THE
WASTE, COST AND HARM OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN TEXAS (2015), available at
http://aclutx.org/download/197.
27
C.W. Brooks, Interpersonal Conflict and Social Tension: Civil Litigation in England,
1640–1830, in THE FIRST MODERN SOCIETY, supra note 23, at 357, 357. Brooks also noted
that eighteenth century rates of civil litigation were lower than in some prior eras. Id. at 396–
97. English history also included a brief period, in the 1760s, when both litigants and
spectators had to pay fees to enter the galleries of the Old Bailey, London’s criminal court.
See John Brewer, The Wilkites and the Law, 1763–74: A Study of Radical Notions of
Governance, in AN UNGOVERNABLE PEOPLE: THE ENGLISH AND THEIR LAW IN THE
SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES 128, 150 (John Brewer & John Styles eds.,
1980); Simon Devereaux, The City and the Sessions Paper: “Public Justice” in London,
1770–1800, 35 J. BRIT. STUD. 466, 486 (1996). Another form of limited access was that not
all the materials submitted were included in the records kept. Id. at 488. By way of
illustration, between 1560 and 1640, “the number of lawyers (‘barristers’) qualified to
practice before the central courts increased fourfold.” Holmes, supra note 21, at 273.
28
See BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, supra note 4, at 355. See generally
Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339.
29
See generally FOUCAULT, supra note 25.
30
BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 4, at 355.
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different utilities turned publicity, for Bentham, into “the very soul of
justice.”31
The idea of the public as an authoritative overseer of the judiciary was part
of a broader reconception of courts’ relationship to the body politic.
Historically, judges served at the pleasure of the monarchs who appointed
them. The English Act of Settlement of 1701 is one marker of shifting norms;
judges no longer lost their commissions when the monarchy changed.32 A
century later, Bentham argued that spectators ought to become active
participants (“auditors” was his term),33 disseminating their own notes, taken
without state control. The public could thus report on how judges treated all
litigants, including when the government (which appointed judges) appeared
before them.
III. CONSTITUTIONALIZING RIGHTS OF THE PUBLIC
The procedural system in the United States, which is at the core of
Professor Subrin’s interests,34 embraced the idea of courts as public venues.
The new states in North America constitutionalized “publicity” by mandating
that “all courts shall be open.”35 What had been rituals of power became
obligations of government, as provisions on open courts were regularly linked
to clauses protecting rights-to-remedies for harms to property and person.
Together, these guarantees generated two kinds of access: empowering
individuals to bring claims to courts and authorizing third parties to watch
proceedings in courts. The 1819 Alabama Constitution is one of many such
texts, with its phrases echoing England’s Magna Carta, providing: “All courts
shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and
justice administered, without sale, denial, or delay.”36
31

JEREMY BENTHAM, Bentham’s Draught for the Organization of Judicial Establishments,
Compared with That of the National Assembly, with a Commentary on the Same, in 4 THE
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 305, 316 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
32
David Lemmings, The Independence of the Judiciary in Eighteenth-Century England, in
THE LIFE OF THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE,
OXFORD 1991, at 125, 125–130 (Peter Birks ed., 1993).
33
BENTHAM, RATIONALE, supra note 4, at 355–56.
34
Professor Subrin has sustained interests in global and comparative procedure as well. See
Margaret Woo, Manning the Courthouse Gate: Pleadings, Jurisdiction, and the NationState, 15 NEV. L.J. 1261 (2015).
35
An overview of many such provisions can be found in Judith Resnik, Constitutional
Entitlements to and in Courts: Remedial Rights in an Age of Egalitarianism: The Childress
Lecture, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 917 (2012).
36
ALA. CONST. of 1819, art. I, § 14. The current Alabama Constitution, ratified in 1901, has
an almost identical clause. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13 (“That all courts shall be open; and
that every person, for any injury done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall
have a remedy by due process of law; and right and justice shall be administered without
sale, denial, or delay.”).
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Yet a reminder is in order. Courts in many states—North and South—were
not then venues in which all persons were equal.37 Indeed, courts were
institutions centered on the protection of property and status-conventional
relationships, as was made painfully clear by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1856
Dred Scott decision, holding that Harriet and Dred Scott could not seek redress
in courts because they lacked legal personhood and juridical capacity.38
The idea of courts as both sources of the recognition that all persons are
equal rights-holders and as resources for the full array of humanity is an
artifact of the First and Second Reconstructions. Not until well into the
twentieth century did U.S. law and practice fully embrace the propositions that
race, gender, and class did not preclude access to courts, that women and men
of all colors could serve as jurors and judges, and that all participants were
entitled to equal dignity and respect.39 Not only did all persons gain
entitlements to courts, but the import of phrases guaranteeing rights-toremedies for “an injury to lands, goods, person, or reputation” changed.
Examples include rights to be free from discrimination; rights for consumers,
employees, and members of households; and the development of protections
for the environment as well as for criminal defendants.
The interaction between the constitutional obligations of earlier eras and
developing commitments to equality turned courts into universal entitlements
and, on occasion, pressed them to be deliberately redistributive as well. Once
the government obliged itself to show “equal concern for the fate of every
person over whom it claims dominion” (to borrow Ronald Dworkin’s
description of equality’s entailments40), courts had new tasks. The promises of
access and remedies become illusory when, for example, courts charge entry
fees that systematically exclude sets of claimants and when government
resources overwhelm opponents.41
37
For example, the Connecticut Constitution of 1818 had a similar set of guarantees. See
CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. I, § 12 (“All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and
right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay.”).
Yet, while protecting rights to “open” courts and to “remedy by due course of law,” the
state did not permit women to vote until after the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment
in 1919, and racial qualifications for voting did not end until after the Civil War. WESLEY W.
HORTON, THE CONNECTICUT STATE CONSTITUTION 18–19 (2d ed. 2012).
38
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 427 (1856); see also LEA VANDERVELDE, MRS. DRED
SCOTT: A LIFE ON SLAVERY’S FRONTIER 233–319 (2009).
39
See generally Judith Resnik, Asking About Gender in Courts, 21 SIGNS 952 (1996).
Further, while my focus is on the United States, these premises have a transnational sweep,
as illustrated by the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, declaring
that “everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
art. 14, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
40
See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 2 (2011).
41
See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78 (2011) [hereinafter Resnik, Fairness
in Numbers].
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But what forms of access ought to be subsidized, which asymmetries
should be addressed, and what costs should be imposed on users? These
questions about the need for resources (both individual and institutional) to
pursue and to entertain claims are not new. In 1793, Jeremy Bentham inveighed
against court fees, which he described as a “tax upon distress.”42 Yet, once all
persons are egalitarian rights-holders, the problems become all the more
acute—both for users and for court systems. Responses promoting access
unfolded during the twentieth century and ranged from workers’ compensation
programs and small claims courts to new constitutional doctrines, such as the
guarantee in Gideon v. Wainwright for indigent defendants facing felony
charges to have state-provided counsel,43 and the requirement in Boddie v.
Connecticut that the state waive fees for indigent litigants seeking divorces.44
Congress authorized the Legal Services Corporation to support poor civil
litigants more generally, and many waves of procedural reforms eased access to
courts and to information from opponents.
IV. THE POLITICAL IMPORT AND THE PRACTICE OF PUBLIC PROCESSES
These brief forays into the development of the public and democratic
functions of courts—and the new challenges that shift has produced—are in
service of analyzing several facets of the contingency of courts, and hence of
what Professor Subrin termed courts’ “values and goals.” A first point is about
the relationship of courts to what political theorists call the “public sphere,”
often defined as civic (rather than governmental) institutions that facilitate
policy debates and the formation of civic cultures.45
These spaces are cherished in democracies for enabling the “public” to
understand its ability to affect government—or as Nancy Fraser explained, the
“public(s),” because the diverse subgroups within democracies constitute
multiple public sphere(s).46 Courts should be understood as falling in the public
sphere category because, while government-supplied, courtrooms are venues
where private and public sectors meet to argue—before an audience of

42
JEREMY BENTHAM, A Protest Against Law-Taxes: Showing the Peculiar Mischievousness
of All Such Impositions as Add to the Expense of Appeal to Justice, in 2 THE WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 573, 582 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
43
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
44
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
45
See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN
INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger trans., 1991); JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW
AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1998).
46
See Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109 (Craig Calhoun,
ed., 1992).
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strangers—about law’s obligations.47 More than that, courts are one sphere
aspiring to cut across class and ethnicity to welcome all who seek to participate.
A second point is that courts have come to serve purposes beyond those
contemplated by Bentham. The social movements of the twentieth century
reinvented courts as venues recognizing the equal rights of all persons and as
sources of new understandings of what “equal” means. Courts operating under
these conditions are not just sources of rights but also sites of democratic
practices—places in which people learn about what democratic interactions
require,48 or about the failure of courts to live up to those obligations.49 In
courts, disputants are obliged to treat opponents civilly, and the state is
compelled to accord women and men of all colors and classes equal respect and
dignity. The public watches those exchanges, as it also learns that law is not
fixed ex ante, but that norms develop in the interaction between fact and law
and attitudes; what law itself is can be seen as contested terrain, produced
through sequences of conflicts and their resolutions.50 Courts are places in
which the sovereignty of the people matters, in which law becomes vivid, and
through which norms are reaffirmed or undermined.
Third, publicity has another, less appreciated, function as foundational to
judicial independence, which in turn is also a predicate to the legitimacy of
adjudication in democracies. I have already adverted to the history of judges
acting as loyal servants of the state. The concept of ordinary judges enjoying an
authority to sit in judgment of the very power that employs them dates back
only a few centuries. In the United States, both state and federal constitutional
commitments to judicial independence have helped to generate a culture that
has come to assume—and therefore to protect—this attribute, even as judicial
independence remains elusive in many parts of the world.51

47

See JOHN R. PARKINSON, DEMOCRACY AND PUBLIC SPACE: THE PHYSICAL SITES OF
DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE (2012).
48
See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY
AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS 288–305 (2011).
49
The new shorthand for these failings is “Ferguson,” as the March report from the U.S.
Department of Justice charted the degree to which its court system was biased. See CIVIL
RIGHTS DIV., supra note 10. Thereafter Missouri’s Supreme Court assigned an appellate
justice to replace the local judge. See Order Transferring The Honorable Roy L. Richter,
Eastern District, Missouri Court of Appeals, to the 21st Judicial Circuit (St. Louis County)
(Mo. Mar. 9, 2015) (en banc).
50
Deborah Hensler, paper presented at Northeastern University School of Law, Through a
Glass Starkly: Civil Procedure Reconsidered, A Symposium Celebrating the Scholarship of
Professor Steve Subrin (Apr. 11, 2014).
51
Several international efforts seek to understand and to support the independence of
judges. See generally THE CULTURE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
AND PRACTICAL CHALLENGES (Shimon Shetreet & Christopher Forsyth eds., 2011); Bernd
Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Mapping Constitutionally Safeguarded Judicial Independence—A
Global Survey, 11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 159 (2014).
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While the meaning of judicial independence is debated, a shared central
premise is that judges are not to be controlled or corrupted by others,52 and
therefore that their judgments merit attention and compliance. Publicity is one
method of producing and policing independence. If judges are on display, the
public can know whether judges bow to the state or to other powerful litigants.
Further, the constitutional obligations of “open courts,” implemented through
statutes creating and funding judiciaries, have made routine the disclosure of
judges’ salaries and court budgets as well as data on filings, trends, case
proceedings, and outcomes.53 Canons of ethics and statutes on disqualification
elaborate standards of conduct, from permissible sources of outside income to
constraints on participating in partisan activities.54
Public processes thus shape judges’ understandings of their own
obligations by placing judges in a structured, deliberate relationship not only
with disputants but also with the body public. This performative facet of
judging is reflected in the phrase “the appearance of justice.”55 In order to
fulfill the mandate that justice both be and appear to be fair, justice has actually
to “appear,” to be visible. The ambitions that democracies have for courts
require that procedural systems be seen, accessible, and knowable—confirming
Bentham’s insistence on publicity’s centrality in and to justice.
Fourth, the practices of judging once made publicity a relatively unselfconscious aspect of adjudication—built from a mix of customs, practices, and
rights, such as jury trials and evidentiary obligations to permit in-person
confrontation of adverse witnesses in criminal cases.56 When, in the 1980s,
Supreme Court justices elaborated the law of public access to courts, they
referenced this history as a natural artifact of trials, always “open to all who

52
Volumes of case law and commentary debate the contours and structural arrangements
that produce and protect judicial independence. See JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman
eds., 2002); Judith Resnik, Interdependent Federal Judiciaries: Puzzling About Why & How
to Value the Independence of Which Judges, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 28.
53
What is available is far from all that is needed. Yet the idea of openness produces
presumptions of how much more data ought to be generated. See Stephen C. Yeazell,
Courting Ignorance: Why We Know So Little About Our Important Courts, DAEDALUS,
Summer 2014, at 129.
54
See Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18 & 28 U.S.C.); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
Canon 3 (2010).
55
See generally JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE (1974). The American
Bar Association’s model rules for judicial conduct commend judges to attend to how others
perceive their actions. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT pmbl. (2010) (urging
judges to “avoid both impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in their professional
and personal lives”).
56
See generally Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2173 (2014).
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care to observe.”57 The material instantiations were the buildings; courthouses
became recognizable structures and icons of government. As localities sought
to mark their own identities, they invested in courthouses to embody their
authority, shape their communities, and attract commerce.
The nexus of adjudication to economic development is exemplified by the
placement of courthouses at the center of towns.58 In some of the oldest county
courthouses, everyone entered the one-room building through the same door.59
In others, courtrooms sat in multi-function municipal centers, often termed
town halls. Localities competed as well to be named the “seat of justice” within
a county, just as cities sought to be state capitals as a way to garner recognition
and expand their commercial base.60
Openness has also been routine for appellate courts. Several state
constitutions directed their supreme courts to write or to publish opinions, to
make them freely available, to let others publish them, and to explain reasons
for dissent. For example, Kentucky’s 1792 Constitution imposed a “duty of
each judge of the Supreme Court, present at the hearing of such cause, and
differing from a majority of the court, to deliver his opinion in writing.”61 West
Virginia instructed judges in its 1872 Constitution to “prepare a syllabus of the
points adjudicated” in those cases with written opinions.62 Arizona, California,
and Michigan insisted that opinions “shall be free for publication by any

57
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 564 (1980). Chief Justice
Burger wrote the plurality opinion for the Court. The concurrence by Justice Brennan, joined
by Justice Marshall, offers a parallel account. Id. at 594–98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
58
For example, the city planners in Warren County sited the courthouse in the center of
town, and only sold the other town lots after it was constructed. See Judith Resnik,
Commentary, “Crack, Jury Chairs, Warren County Courthouse, Warrenton, Missouri,”
DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 180.
59
The Fulton County Courthouse, one of the oldest courthouses in the country, is one
such example. The courthouse building consisted entirely of one courtroom, and a
separate building to house the County Clerk was not constructed until more than
forty years after the courthouse’s construction. See Fulton County Courthouse, N.Y.
ST. UNIFIED CT. SYS., http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/documents
/Courthouse_History-Fulton-County.pdf (last visited June 30, 2015).
In contrast, courtroom space occupies less than 10 percent of the John Joseph Moakley
United States Courthouse in Boston, which opened in 1998. See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION, JOHN JOSEPH MOAKLEY UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE AND HARBORPARK,
BOSTON MASSACHUSETTS 32 (2003); Douglas P. Woodlock, Dedication Ceremony of the
John Joseph Moakley United States Courthouse: Boston, Massachusetts, April 18, 2001, 17
NEW ENG. J. PUB. POL’Y 9, 9 (2001); Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary (Literally
and Legally): The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87 IND. L.J.
823, 897–98 (2012) [hereinafter Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary].
60
See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 48, at 134–153.
61
KY. CONST. of 1792, art. V, § 4.
62
W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VIII, § 5. West Virginia’s current constitution is an amended
version of its 1872 constitution, and includes the same requirement. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 4.
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person.”63 Once again, such legal provisions helped to produce public spaces.
Just as localities put courts at their towns’ center, states built complexes for
their capitals and either included grand courtrooms for their supreme courts in
their (often domed) state capital building or erected separate imposing
courthouses as part of a government complex.64
The federal adjudicatory system was layered on top of the court systems
provided by the states. The first Judiciary Act created thirteen federal districts
and a barebones federal judicial staff, rendering them relatively inaccessible as
contrasted with state courts. Before 1850, no building was called a federal
courthouse; about forty lower-court federal judges were dispersed around the
country. Federal judges either occupied rooms in federal buildings such as
Custom Houses, rented spaces from states, or used commercial buildings; a

63

ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 8 (“Provision shall be made by law for the speedy publication of
the opinions of the supreme court, and they shall be free for publication by any person.”);
CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. VI, § 12 (superseded by the California Constitution of 1879, which
did not address the issue, but was later revised in 1966 to state that Supreme Court opinions
“shall be available for publication by any person,” CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14 (1966) (“The
Legislature shall provide for the prompt publication of such opinions of the Supreme Court
and courts of appeal as the Supreme Court deems appropriate, and those opinions shall be
available for publication by any person. Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal
that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.”)); MICH. CONST. of 1963, art.
IV, § 35 (“All laws and judicial decisions shall be free for publication by any person.”). The
same provision existed in Michigan’s 1850 Constitution, MICH. CONST. of 1850, art. IV,
§ 36, but not in Michigan’s initial 1835 constitution. The current Michigan Constitution also
provides:
Decisions of the supreme court, including all decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing
and shall contain a concise statement of the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for
each denial of leave to appeal. When a judge dissents in whole or in part he shall give in writing
the reasons for his dissent.

MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6.
Maryland’s Constitution provides similarly that “[p]rovision shall be made by Law for
publishing Reports of all causes, argued and determined in the Court of Appeals and in the
intermediate courts of appeal, which the judges thereof, respectively, shall designate as
proper for publication.” MD. CONST. art. IV, § 16. In addition, New Jersey’s 1844
Constitution required judges to provide “reasons . . . in writing,” N.J. CONST. of 1844, art.
VI, § 2, but neither New Jersey’s original 1776 constitution nor its current constitution, in
place since 1947, contain a similar provision.
64
The Indiana Statehouse in Indianapolis, constructed in 1888, and the Oklahoma State
Capitol in Oklahoma City, completed in 1917, are examples of the decision to place a
courtroom for the Supreme Court in the same building where the legislature meets. The
Statehouse Story, IN.GOV, http://www.in.gov/idoa/2431.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2014);
Oklahoma Capitol, OKLA. HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc
/entry.php?entry=OK080 (last visited June 30, 2015). Illustrative of the decision to build a
separate impressive structure are Connecticut, which built a courthouse for its Supreme
Court in 1910, Virtual Tour of the Connecticut Supreme Court, CONN. SUPREME CT.
HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.jud.ct.gov/historicalsociety/tour.htm (last visited June 30, 2015),
and Washington, which became a state in 1889 and which also opened an imposing
courthouse for its Supreme Court in 1913, History of the Temple of Justice, WASH. ST.
CAPITOL CAMPUS TEMPLE OF JUSTICE CENTENNIAL, http://www.templecentennial.wa.gov
/index.cfm?fa=home.templeHistory (last visited May 27, 2015).
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single federal trial judge, sitting in a state such as Maryland or Indiana, had
little need for a courthouse of his own.
Yet the dominant mode of procedure—trials—built the public into the
process. The Judiciary Act of 1789 mandated that “oral testimony and
examination of witnesses in open court . . . be the same in all the courts of the
United States.”65 Juries had to be drawn from the venire in which criminal
indictments were lodged, and the Sixth Amendment required a “speedy and
public trial” for those facing criminal charges.66
The growth in the number and docket of lower federal courts came after
the Civil War, as the national economy expanded and Congress enacted new
jurisdictional statutes and created the Department of Justice. Rising caseloads
produced demands for more judgeships, for more courthouses, and for new
procedures to unify federal practice nationwide.67
V. ENABLING AND COMPLICATING ACCESSIBILITY: THE 1938
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Professor Subrin has provided a history of the enactment of the 1934 Rules
Enabling Act,68 authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate procedural rules
applicable in federal courts across the country.69 The normative goals shaping
the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitated a reconceptualization of
federal adjudication by welcoming into court a diverse array of persons who
became rights-holders as the century unfolded. Scholars have chronicled the
underpinnings of the 1938 Rules—with their functionalist, anti-formalist
commitments to easing barriers to entry through trans-substantive, uniform,
national provisions that expanded opportunities for information exchange,
vested discretion in trial judges, and aimed for efficient decision-making
focused on the merits of claims.70
65

Judiciary Act of 1789 § 30, 1 Stat. 73, 88.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
67
Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary, supra note 59, at 826–27 figs.2 & 3.
68
See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin,
How Equity Conquered Common Law]; see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982).
69
See Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers & Stephen N. Subrin, The Role of Local Rules,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 62.
70
See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286
(2013); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 68; Judith Resnik, Failing
Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 494–98, 502–15 (1986)
[hereinafter Resnik, Failing Faith]; Burbank, supra note 68, at 1131–1163. David Shapiro
provided a caveat on identifying purposes of a diverse group; he also concluded that the
goals included restructuring civil process, achieving more uniformity in federal practice,
escaping “rigidities and technicalities” through flexibility, and embracing adversarialism in
litigation but without a focus solely on trials. See David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look
at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1972–1977 (1989).
66
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Those rules intersected with waves of new statutory rights and with
funding for dozens of construction projects that enlarged the federal courthouse
footprint. Congress substantially increased the number of federal life-tenured
judgeships and, during the second half of the twentieth century, chartered new
kinds of auxiliary personnel—magistrate and bankruptcy judges working in
federal courts and administrative judges deployed in agencies.71
To return to the two facets of “open courts,” the 1938 Rules were dooropening in facilitating case filings. Yet the Rules also created obstacles for the
other aspect of “open courts”—the potential for third parties to observe directly
the proceedings. Through fashioning new pretrial procedures, the Federal Rules
enabled the development of a litigation system in which trials became rare and
key exchanges took place outside the courtroom.72 “Trial lawyers” came to be
replaced by “litigators,” focused on pretrial motions and discovery, and by
“problem-solving lawyers,” aiming for resolutions without trials. Judges
became managers of both cases and lawyers.73 Over the decades, civil trial rates
and the absolute number of trials declined—prompting judges to record their
concerns that the phrase “trial judge” was becoming anachronistic.74 In 2012,
fewer than 1.2 percent of cases reached trial.75
Yet the 1938 Rules also provided new routes for information about claims
to reach the public. The litigations that the Rules helped to spawn generated a
wealth of public information. Until 2000, Rule 5 provided that discovery was to
be filed with courts,76 and common law practices (with their constitutional
overtones) made materials filed in court presumptively available for public

71

28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 157–158, 631–636 (2012). See generally Judith Resnik, “Uncle Sam
Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for
the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607 (2002).
72
See Stephen C. Yeazell, Essay, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil
Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631 (1994); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial
in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522 (2012).
73
See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) [hereinafter Resnik,
Managerial Judges].
74
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture: So Why Do
We Still Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. Rev. 1405 (2002); William G. Young, An
Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, FEDERAL LAWYER, July 2003, at 30; see also Jordan M.
Singer and William G. Young, Bench Presence 2014: An Updated Look at Federal District
Court Productivity, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 565 (2014).
75
Table C-4: U.S. District Courts—Civil Cases Terminated, by Nature of Suit and Action
Taken, During the 12-Month Period Ending December 31, 2012, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/10298/ (last visited May 29, 2015); see also Marc Galanter &
Angela M. Frozena, A Grin Without a Cat: The Continuing Decline & Displacement of
Trials in American Courts, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 115.
76
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) had provided that discovery materials were to be
filed “within a reasonable time.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d), 308 U.S. 645, 669 (1939)
(submitted in 1937 to be effective in 1938).
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review.77 The opportunities to obtain documents from opponents (including
governments and commercial enterprises) turned discovery into what my
colleague Owen Fiss termed the “poor person’s FBI.”78 Revisions in the 1960s
opened doors to class actions, and a federal statute enacted in 1968 authorized
coordination across districts in large-scale litigations. As another renowned
proceduralist—Professor Benjamin Kaplan—commented at the 1988
commemoration of fifty years of the Federal Rules, the Rules “have worked to
considerable (if not universal) satisfaction to support revolutions of the
substantive law. The much criticized discovery function and class action
remain together the scourge of corporate and governmental malefactors.”79
Kaplan’s description of the Rules as “much criticized” reflects the role
courts play in the public sphere. Rights to public courts and rights in public
courts generated conflicts about what obligations law ought to impose and the
scope of the remedies. Vivid examples include mass litigation against injuries
from cigarettes, asbestos, and pharmaceuticals, as well as individual cases
focused on violence inside households.80 The many public disclosures
prompted debates on what ought to constitute cognizable harms, who ought to
be seen as deserving of what remedies, whether aggregation through class
actions helped pool claimants or inappropriately altered defendants’ incentives,
and what forms of relief ought to be available. Politically-charged exchanges
ensued about litigation, lawyers, and rights, as the platforms of national parties
advocated for or against curbing access to courts—often argued in terms of
costs, delays, and claims about whether litigation undercut economic growth
and imposed unduly high needs for insurance or enabled wrongdoers to be
brought to justice.81
Those conflicts, coupled with the cost of lawyers during decades when the
demand for federal adjudication appeared unending,82 put pressures on the
77

See Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1802–05 (2014)
[hereinafter Resnik, Privatization of Process].
78
Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the Death of
Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173 (2003).
79
Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1879, 1881 (1989). He added that
“fundamental faults of litigation procedure—for example, the handicapping of the weak,
despite statutory help for them here and there—should be attributed not to the Rules, but
rather to the state of the nation.” Id.
80
One example, related to asbestos, comes from the information about the “Sumner
Simpson papers,” demonstrating that executives in asbestos manufacturing companies were
aware in the 1930s–1950s of the dangers of asbestos but did not inform workers of those
risks. A deposition of a company executive’s son and efforts to prevent the disclosure
brought the information to light. See Threadgill v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 928 F.2d
1366, 1372–74 (3d Cir. 1991).
81
See Stephen C. Yeazell, Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and
the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1752 (2013).
82
See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
18 (1995), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2826/. Some aspects of this report
have been superseded by JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE

1650

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1631

procedures the Federal Rules provided. Various sectors, with different agendas,
argued for revisions. Celebrants of adjudication wanted to protect it and sought
alternatives to divert some disputes to different venues. Some critics hoped for
a friendlier “alternative” that would be less adversarial and more generative.83
Others promoted ADR from a perspective critical of adjudication, seen by
corporate and government sectors as a drag on innovation and intrusive on
decision-making.84 These various strands produced a national movement
seeking changes in rules, statutes, law school courses, and legal practice. A
sequence of revisions of the Federal Rules (in what Thomas Main and Stephen
Subrin have termed a “fourth wave” of procedural reform85) have now
combined to limit the opportunities members of the public have to watch the
interactions between judges and disputants in courthouses.
A central example in the federal system is the evolution of Rule 16,
governing pretrial activities. The Rule, coupled with statutes and local
practices, has redirected judges away from public adjudication and towards
becoming case managers promoting settlement.86 When first drafted as part of
the 1938 Federal Rules, the possibility of a “pre-trial” meeting between judges
and lawyers was innovative.87 As I have detailed elsewhere, the initial
conception was not to put judges in the business of pressing for settlement but
to help focus the disputants on what would be needed, if the case were to
proceed to trial.88 However, the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 reflect the
success of promoters of managerial judging, who changed the mandate for
judges by tasking them with taking control of lawyers and cases, so as to
structure the process and encourage the parties to settle their differences rather
than litigate.
In the 1983 amendments, “pre-trial” lost its hyphen, which had served to
signal its function as a predicate to a trial; the noun “pretrial” became an event
unto itself. The 1983 revision detailed what judges could do during pretrial,
FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2748/, archived at
https://perma.cc/5NBF-SG9C?type=pdf; see also Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra
note 77, at 1799 figs.1 & 2, 1821–23.
83
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995).
84
The terrain is mapped in Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L.
REV. 165 (2003).
85
Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162
U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014).
86
See Resnik, Privatization of Process, supra note 77, at 1803–06; Resnik, Managerial
Judges, supra note 73, at 399–402. See generally Resnik, Failing Faith, supra note 70.
87
State court judges sometimes held what were then termed “pre-trial” conferences, and
those became models for the 1938 rules. See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at
384–85 nn.50–51.
88
Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 73, at 384–86; Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924,
935–37 (2000).
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including proposing that litigants use what the rule termed “extrajudicial”
efforts—various forms of ADR.89
By 1993, what the Federal Rule drafters had situated a decade earlier as
“extrajudicial” was reconceived to be internal to the judicial role; pretrial
conferences became occasions for judges themselves to “consider and take
appropriate action” on a host of activities, from “settling the case and using
special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute” through forms of ADR90 to
“disposing of pending motions” and organizing the presentation of evidence.91
This pro-settlement stance is featured in materials the federal judiciary provides
to the public. The judiciary’s website, adorned with an eagle at its top, offers
help in “Understanding the Federal Courts” by explaining how the Federal
courts work. In 2015, the text chosen to be set off in a separate box stated: “To
avoid the expense and delay of having a trial, judges encourage the litigants to
try to reach an agreement resolving their dispute.”92
Local rules provide additional directions to put settlement at the
forefront.93 For example, the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts (where
Northeastern University Law School hosted the symposium in honor of
Professor Subrin) directs that, at “every conference conducted under these
rules, the judicial officer shall inquire as to the utility of the parties conducting
settlement negotiations.”94
Clarity on six points is required before turning to an analysis of the
relationship between these new ADR procedures, publicity, and adjudication in
democracies. First, under the umbrella of ADR come various procedures, some
focused on conciliation, either by way of bilateral negotiations or with the
assistance of third parties, including judges, mediators, or other “neutrals.”
Some of the programs entail structured exchanges, such as “mini-trials” in
89

See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2) (providing that “[a]t any pretrial conference, the court may
consider and take appropriate action on the following matters,” including “settling the case
and using special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute when authorized by statute or
local rule”).
90
Id. R. 16(c)(2)(I).
91
Id. R. 16(c)(K), (N).
92
Civil Cases, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/types-cases
/civil-cases (last visited May 29, 2015).
93
Rulemaking at the local level is also a topic Professor Subrin has analyzed. See Stephen
N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and
Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999 (1989); Coquillette, Squiers &
Subrin, supra note 69.
94
See D. MASS. CIV. R. 16.4, available at http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/general/pdf
/combined01.pdf (“(a) The judicial officer shall encourage the resolution of disputes by
settlement or other alternative dispute resolution programs. (b) Settlement. At every
conference conducted under these rules, the judicial officer shall inquire as to the utility of
the parties conducting settlement negotiations, explore means of facilitating those
negotiations, and offer whatever assistance may be appropriate in the circumstances.
Assistance may include a reference of the case to another judicial officer for settlement
purposes. Whenever a settlement conference is held, a representative of each party who has
settlement authority shall attend or be available by telephone.”).
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which each side is present and advocates present summaries of the arguments
to help the principals understand the strengths and weaknesses of their and their
adversary’s positions. Another alternative, styled “court-annexed arbitration,”
occurs after cases are filed; courts invite a third party (generally chosen from a
panel of pre-selected lawyers) to decide an outcome.95 This type of arbitration
is to be distinguished from a contractual agreement not to use courts, as well as
from recent interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act under which courts
enforce clauses in documents governing the purchase of consumer goods and
job applications mandating the use of private providers in lieu of courts.96
Second, the use of all kinds of ADR could be voluntary or mandatory, and
court rules range from mentioning the options to requiring their use.97 For
example, in the federal system, judges can insist that disputants attend
settlement discussions but cannot require disputants to settle.98 Similarly, some
states have rules requiring disputants in certain kinds of cases (such as those
involving family dissolution) to mediate as a predicate to adjudication,
available only if mediation does not resolve the issues. In some jurisdictions,
court-annexed arbitration is optional, and in others, required.
The third issue is the impact of whatever resolutions are reached. If parties
agree to end their disputes by settling them, those agreements preclude
returning to court. But the use of mediation or arbitration may be “nonbinding”—even when mandated—and hence not preclusive of a trial or
additional litigation thereafter.
Fourth, to seek resolutions through court-encouraged settlements and other
forms of ADR does not, intrinsically, require private processes. Criminal law is
also replete with ADR, called in that context “plea bargaining” and “diversion.”
95

In a few jurisdictions, arbitrations are functionally short-form trials, in which thousands of
cases are sent to panels of lawyer-arbitrators, operating under rules incorporating many of
the state’s civil rules while shaping a presumptively brief (a few hours) hearing. As Illinois’s
Uniform Arbitrator Reference Manual explains, the state mandated arbitration
“for some types of civil disputes” to help reduce “court congestion, costs, and delay. . . .
The goal of the process . . . is to deliver a high quality, low cost, expeditious
hearing in eligible cases, resulting in an award that will enable, but not mandate,
parties to resolve their dispute without a formal trial.” ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
COORDINATING COMM. OF THE ILL. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY
ARBITRATION PROGRAM: UNIFORM ARBITRATOR REFERENCE MANUAL 2 (2010), available
at http://www.dupageco.org/courts/33051/, archived at http://perma.cc/4BRF-UAAJ
[hereinafter ILLINOIS UNIFORM ARBITRATOR REFERENCE MANUAL].
96
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act is the subject of much
discussion. See Resnik, Fairness in Numbers, supra note 41, at 118–54; Resnik, Diffusing
Disputes, supra note 7, at 2874–93.
97
A helpful overview of the procedures used across the country is provided by DONNA
STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ADR IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN INITIAL REPORT
(2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/adr2011.pdf/$file/adr2011.pdf.
Additional research for another report is underway. See Dispute Resolution in Federal
Courts: New Study to Look at How It’s Working, U.S. CTS. (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.us
courts.gov/news/2014/01/23/dispute-resolution-federal-courts-new-study-look-how-its-working.
98
See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f).
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Yet aspects of these processes are mandatorily brought before the public. Pretrial hearings and plea bargains are both “on the record,” exemplifying that
trials are not the only procedural format providing rights of audience. On the
civil side, judges can convene conferences (whether in person or via
teleconferencing) in open court where strangers can walk in, or judges can
locate such exchanges in chambers to which the public has no access.99
Similarly, court-annexed arbitrations could be held in courtrooms, other public
venues, or not.
Fifth is the question of costs. ADR procedures may be offered as part of
the packet of state-paid and state-subsidized services when cases are filed, or
ADR may be separately priced. Staffing may come from full-time court
employees (judges included), or from third parties who either volunteer or are
paid by the court or by disputants. For example, the policymaking body for the
federal courts provided in 1999 that local rules should address the
compensation of court-appointed “neutrals” and whether they would serve “pro
bono or for a fee.”100 The related commentary called for participants “unable to
afford the cost of ADR [to be] excused from paying.”101 Pursuant to this
mandate, for example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has specified that
the hourly fees were to be paid by funds from the federal judiciary.102
Sixth, given the array of processes and the combinations among the
different facets outlined above, a positive accounting of all the variations is
difficult. My focus here is on the relationship of the public to court-based ADR
in terms of whether the processes are, in practice, open for strangers to attend
and the outcomes made available through publication or otherwise. My
question is whether constitutional obligations of access to courts ought to be
99

See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, The Reappearing Judge, 61 U. KAN. L. REV.
849, 858–59 (2013).
100
See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES
53 (Sept. 1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/2130/ [hereinafter SEPT. 1999
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS]. The statute authorized the Conference to regulate
compensation. See 28 U.S.C. § 658 (2012). The “non-mandatory principles” included
making known rates and limits of compensation and requiring fee disclosures. Thanks to
Donna Stienstra for pointing us to these sources. See also Jason Bertoldi, Compensating
ADR Neutrals in the Federal Courts (Feb. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
101
SEPT. 1999 REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 100, at 53–54.
102
E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(2) (calling for compensation of $150 per hour for single
arbitrators). In the Eastern District of New York, local rules provide compensation, to “be
paid by or pursuant to the order of the Court subject to the limits set by the Judicial
Conference” of “$250 for services in each case,” unless protracted, and if three arbitrators
are used, the compensation is “$100 for service” for each. E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.7(b);
see also D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. 201.1(c) (calling for compensation of “$250 for service in
each case” unless the proceeding is protracted); M.D. GA. LOCAL R. 16.2.2(C) (providing
that “arbitrators shall be compensated for their services in such amounts and in such manner
as the Chief Judge shall specify from time to time by standing order”); N.D. CAL. ADR
LOCAL R. 4-3(b) (calling for compensation of $250 per day for single arbitrators and $150
per day for each member of a panel of three).
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read to govern the alternatives to adjudication that judges promote and
superintend.
VI. FINDING THE PUBLIC IN COURT-BASED ADR
Debate exists about how much ADR is used in courts, as well as what
metrics to use to assess its impact. Yet, on two measures—the volume of
rulemaking and the privatization of court-based interactions—the results are
unambiguous: courts have promulgated hundreds of rules governing various
forms of ADR, and those rules do not protect rights of the public to observe the
processes or to know much about the results.
Locating rules addressing court-based ADR required reviews of statutes,
national and local rules, doctrine, manuals, overviews, ad hoc databases, and
interviews with court staff.103 Despite a good deal of overlap, in part shaped by
model rules,104 specifying the current state of public access to court-based ADR
is difficult because rules regulating ADR generally do not take that issue as a
category of analysis. To the extent that third parties are referenced, the context
is usually an admonition that confidentiality is required of participants in ADR
processes.
Given my discussion of the evolution of Federal Rule 16 governing
“pretrial” procedures in the federal courts, a first example comes from that
Rule. Court-convened conferences with judges could be on the record in open
court, just as in criminal proceedings, “pleas, sentencing, case conferences, and
adjournments” are generally held in courtrooms.105 But the federal civil rules

103

Once again, acknowledgement of tireless work by the students cited above is in order, as
they combed a host of sources and called many courts in the quest for this information.
104
See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT STANDING COMM. ON ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ADR
GUIDEBOOK (2003); STIENSTRA, supra note 97, app. 2 (Court Admin. & Case Mgmt. Comm.
of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Attributes of a Well-Functioning Court ADR Program
and Ethical Principles for ADR Neutrals (1997)); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000),
available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf;
UNIF. MEDIATION ACT (2003), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs
/mediation/uma_final_03.pdf; see also Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil Actions,
LEXISNEXIS, May 2013, http://advance.lexis.com (search for “ ‘Alternative Dispute
Resolution in Civil Actions’ ”; then filter to “Secondary Materials”; then view entry titled
“Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil Actions (May 2013)”).
105
Simonson, supra note 56, at 2175; see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (PressEnterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II),
478 U.S. 1 (1986); El Vocero de Puerto Rico (Caribbean Int’l News Corp.) v. Puerto Rico,
508 U.S. 147 (1993). Simonson argued that the U.S. Constitution obliges judiciaries to keep
all non-trial criminal adjudication open and that, given the decline of jury trials, this right is
sometimes under-enforced. Simonson, supra note 56, at 2177–79; 2206–21. Her examples
included the routine closing of arraignments and misdemeanor courtrooms in certain
localities and ad hoc exclusions, sometimes based on limited space for observers. Id. at
2191–93. Further, she argued that an “audience of locals” was particularly important in that
defendants are disproportionately from minority communities, under-represented in the
professional participants in courtrooms. Id. at 2202–05.
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do not specify that pretrial meetings be open to the public or on the record.106
Indeed, the literature on mediation and settlement generally identifies private
exchanges as central to facilitated agreements; privacy is seen as useful to
induce uninhibited discussions, freed from concerns that concessions proposed
or explored will later be used as evidence at trial or otherwise.
Yet the rationales supporting privacy when negotiating do not readily apply
either to outcomes or to court-annexed arbitration, in which a third party
renders a decision based on presentations by the disputants. That process is
available in state and in federal courts. In 1988, for example, in the “Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act,”107 Congress selected ten district
courts that could mandate court-annexed arbitration for a limited set of cases
involving monetary damages under $100,000; in addition, the statute permitted
judges to refer to arbitration cases involving civil rights and constitutional
claims—if the parties consented and if the issues were not novel.108
The 1988 statute regulated the use of arbitration by including provisions
governing the appointment of arbitrators, their certification, and their
obligations. Arbitrators, described by 1998 as “performing quasi-judicial
functions,”109 were subject to the rules of disqualification that applied to federal
judges.110 Congress also specified the possibility of trial de novo, with
assessment of fees for arbitration if the outcome at trial was less favorable than
had been achieved in arbitration.111
The 1988 provisions neither addressed the role of the public at such
proceedings nor spoke in general about confidentiality but did provide that
awards were not to be “made known” to judges assigned to the cases, so as to
insulate them if litigation resumed.112 Further, the information adduced during

106

Conferencing by telephone is mentioned as an option for scheduling conferences. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1)(B).
107
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 901, 102 Stat.
4642, 4659 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)).
108
Id. Note that the 1998 revision, discussed infra notes 114–20 and accompanying text,
does not include the limitation precluding cases that include novel issues. In the 1998
Amendment, as well as the original 1988 statute, if the court’s jurisdiction rested on 28
U.S.C. § 1343, which is available for cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arbitration is not
permitted. Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, § 6, 112 Stat.
2993, 2995 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 654(a)(3) (2012)).
109
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, § 7, 112 Stat. at 2996 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 655(c) (2012)).
110
Also provided was authority for courts to compensate them. Judicial Improvements and
Access to Justice Act, § 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4662 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 656–
657 (2012)).
111
In the 1988 provisions, Congress had provided that if a party did less well in the de novo
trial, fee-shifting was permissible. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act,
§ 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4661. That provision is not replicated in the 1998 statute.
112
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, § 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4661 (1988)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 657(b) (2012) (“Sealing of Arbitration Award”)).
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arbitration and the awards made were not to be admitted as evidence if a trial
took place subsequent to the arbitration.113
A decade later, the “Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998”114
required that all federal district courts “shall authorize, by local rule . . . , the
use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions,” including the
“use of arbitration.”115 Those provisions altered somewhat the category of cases
for which arbitration was permissible.116 Further, Congress specified court
authority to appoint additional personnel (“neutrals”117 and “arbitrators”118) as
staff and called on the Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) and the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts to “assist the district courts in the establishment and
improvement” of programs.119
Congress also required district courts to protect the “confidentiality of
alternative dispute resolution processes” through prohibitions on “disclosure of
confidential dispute resolution communications.”120 The statute could be read
to suggest, but does not speak directly to, the question of whether arbitration
proceedings themselves constituted “confidential dispute resolution
communications,” and little reported case law addresses the issue.121

113

Id. § 901(a), 102 Stat. at 4660 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 657(c)(3) (2012)
(“Limitation on Admission of Evidence”)). This constraint adds arbitration proceedings to
the limits imposed by federal evidentiary rules which have, since 1975, precluded admission
of information obtained in a mediation or settlement conference. See FED. R. EVID. 408.
114
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)).
115
28 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2012). The statute explained that its provisions were not to affect
existing programs under the 1988 statute. See id. § 654(d). This provision means that
districts that had the authority, under the 1988 act, to mandate arbitration for eligible cases,
could continue to do so.
116
See id. § 654(a) (authorizing referrals of “any civil action (including any adversary
proceeding in bankruptcy) pending before it when the parties consent, except . . . [actions]
based on an alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States [or
when] jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on section 1343 of this title,” or when the
relief sought in monetary damages exceeds $150,000).
117
Id. § 653.
118
Id. § 655.
119
Id. § 651(f).
120
Id. § 652(d) (“Confidentiality Provisions”). Congress called on districts to adopt local
rules implementing confidentiality and in the interim provided this provision. See infra notes
128–30 for discussion of some federal court local rules on arbitration and on confidentiality
more generally.
121
One 2007 lower court decision referenced the statute as if it was a congressional mandate
that court-annexed arbitrations be confidential. In Stepp v. NCR Corp., 494 F. Supp. 2d 826,
836–37 (S.D. Ohio 2007), an employee who had lost a job and alleged age discrimination,
and the employer sought confidential compulsory arbitration outside of the courts. The
district court rejected the claim that closure failed to vindicate his statutory rights by citing
not only the case law on the Federal Arbitration Act but also 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (1948),
which the court read as providing “confidentiality in court mandated arbitration.” Id. at 837
(citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991)).
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Forays into rules promulgated at the district court level were therefore in
order. As noted, Congress in 1988 permitted ten districts to create mandatory
court-annexed arbitration programs.122 Thus, one way to learn about whether
rules carved out places for the public in ADR was to review the 2014 local
rules in the ten district courts that have had statutory authority to provide courtannexed arbitration for about twenty-five years.
Having such authority does not necessarily translate into using it. As of the
spring of 2015, four of the original ten district courts licensed to mandate courtannexed arbitration had rules providing for it, and three districts continued their
mandatory arbitration programs.123 Another of the original ten districts—the
Western District of Michigan—had repealed its obligations to arbitrate, and
explained its decision with the comment that the “Court’s experience with
alternative means of dispute resolution in this district shows that attorneys and
clients rarely resort to court-annexed arbitration, as they prefer other methods
of dispute resolution, especially voluntary facilitative mediation.”124 Four of the
remaining five districts had no rules directing mandatory court-annexed
arbitration,125 and in the one that did, staff indicated in interviews that no
arbitrations had been held in the last two years.126
122

As noted, in its 1998 amendments, Congress specified that the revisions did not “affect
any program in which arbitration is conducted pursuant to [the 1988 statute].” 28 U.S.C.
§ 654(d)(2012).
123
See D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. 201.1(d)(1) (“Subject to the exceptions set forth in [the local
rules], the Clerk shall designate and process for compulsory arbitration any civil action
pending before the Court where the relief sought consists only of money damages not in
excess of $150,000 exclusive of interest and costs and any claim for punitive damages.”);
E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.7(d)(1) (requiring that the Clerk of the Court “designate and
process for compulsory arbitration all civil cases . . . wherein money damages only are being
sought in an amount not in excess of $150,000.00 exclusive of interest and costs.”); E.D. PA.
LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(3)(a) (explaining that the Clerk shall “designate and process for
compulsory arbitration all civil cases (including adversary proceedings in bankruptcy,
excluding, however, (1) social security cases, (2) cases in which a prisoner is a party, (3)
cases alleging a violation of a right secured by the U.S. Constitution, and (4) actions in
which jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on 28 U.S.C. §1343) wherein money damages
only are being sought in an amount not in excess of $150,000.00 exclusive of interest and
costs”). The fourth district, the Northern District of California, continued to have a rule
related to arbitration but had not used that provision for some time. See N.D. CAL. ADR
LOCAL R. 3-2 (“Litigants in certain cases designated when the complaint or notice of
removal is filed are presumptively required to participate in one non-binding ADR process
offered by the Court (Arbitration, Early Neutral Evaluation, or Mediation) or, with the
assigned Judge’s permission, may substitute an ADR process offered by a private
provider.”); Telephone Interview with Donna Stienstra, Senior Researcher, Fed. Judicial Ctr.
(June, 2015).
124
See Paul L. Maloney, Chief Judge, W.D. Mich., Administrative Order Re: Proposed
Amendments to Local Civil Rule 16 to Eliminate Court-Annexed Arbitration, Admin. Order
No. 12-028 (March 8, 2012) (“After consulting with this Court’s Standing . . . Advisory
Committee, the Court has concluded that court-annexed arbitration should no longer be
offered as a method of alternative dispute resolution in this district.”).
125
See M.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 8.02(a) (“Any civil action may be referred to arbitration in
accordance with this rule if the parties consent in writing to arbitration [with exceptions].”);
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In addition to focusing on how the ten, 1988-authorized districts were
dealing with court-annexed arbitration, these courts also offer a window into
rules about the public’s role in other kinds of ADR. In general, the rules of
these districts protect confidentiality. To the extent the public comes into view,
it is as an entity to be avoided. The texts varied: some spoke about the
confidentiality of ADR per se, and others directly mentioned specific kinds of
ADR. Three districts provided that any alternative dispute resolution
proceeding be confidential, but did not specify which forms of ADR were
encompassed within the rule.127 Four districts required that mediation and/or
W.D.N.C. L.Cv.R. 16.3(B)(1) (“If a mediated settlement conference is ordered, the conduct
of the ADR proceeding shall be governed by the Rules Governing Mediated Settlement
Conferences in Superior Court Civil Actions promulgated by the North Carolina Supreme
Court pursuant to N. C. Gen. Stat. 7A-38 (the ‘Mediation Rules’), and by the supplemental
rules set forth herein.” The statute these rules incorporate indicates that “[t]he senior resident
superior court judge, at the request of and with the consent of the parties, may order the
parties to attend and participate in any other settlement procedure authorized by rules of the
Supreme Court or by the local superior court rules, in lieu of attending a mediated settlement
conference. . . . Nothing in this section shall prohibit the parties from participating in, or the
court from ordering, other dispute resolution procedures, including arbitration to the extent
authorized under State or federal law.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.1(i)); W.D. OKLA. L.CV.R.
16.1(c) (“The court authorizes Alternative Dispute Resolution methods, including mediation,
judicial settlement conferences, and summary jury trials.”); W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-88(c)
(“The court may refer a case to ADR on the motion of a party, on the agreement of the
parties, or on its own motion; however, the court may refer a case to arbitration only with the
consent of the parties (including but not limited to their consent by contract to arbitration).”);
General Order, Western District of Missouri Mediation and Assessment Program
§ II.B. (2012), available at http://www.mow.uscourts.gov/district/map/MAPGeneralOrder_
2013-08-01.pdf [hereinafter MAP General Order, W.D. Mo.] (“If the parties are unable to
agree, the Director in his or her discretion, after consultation with one or all the parties, may
select some other form of ADR.”).
126
Telephone Interview with Jill Morris, Mediation and Assessment Program Dir., W. Dist.
Mo. (June 2015).
127
The Western District of Michigan’s rule “Confidentiality” provides: “All ADR
proceedings are considered to be compromise negotiations within the meaning of Fed. R.
Evid. 408.” W.D. MICH. L.CIV.R. 16.2(d). The rules define ADR proceedings to include
Voluntary Facilitative Mediation (L.CIV.R. 16.3); Early Neutral Evaluation (L.CIV.R. 16.4);
Case Evaluation (L.CIV.R. 16.5); Summary Jury Trials, Summary Bench Trials (L.CIV.R.
16.7); and Settlement Conferences (L.CIV.R. 16.8). In addition, the rule references “other
ADR methods proposed by the parties.” W.D. MICH. L.CIV.R. 16.2(a).
In the Western District of Missouri’s “General Order, Western District of Missouri
Mediation and Assessment Program,” Part VIII addresses the confidentiality of ADR
proceedings, and authorizes the mediator to “ask the parties and all persons attending the
mediation to sign a confidentiality agreement.” MAP General Order, W.D. Mo., supra note
125, § VIII.E (“Confidentiality Agreement”). Further, that rule provides:
1. This Court shall treat as confidential all written and oral communications, not under oath,
made in connection with or during any Program session except as otherwise noted in this
Section.
2. Any communication not under oath made in connection with any proceeding in this Program
shall not be disclosed to anybody unrelated to the Program by the parties, their counsel,
Mediators or any other participant in the Program and shall not be used for any purpose in
any pending or future proceeding in this Court except by consent of the parties or as allowed
under the Federal Rules of Evidence or this Section. Communications made in connection
with any proceeding in this Program include the comments, assessments, evaluations or
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early neutral evaluation be confidential but did not address court-annexed
arbitration.128 Three districts had different rules for mediation and for
arbitration and imposed mandates of confidentiality on mediation; in contrast,
the arbitration rules focused on the inadmissibility of information at trial129—
recommendations of the Mediator. Mediators shall not discuss any matter communicated to
them during any Program proceeding except with the permission of the parties . . . .

Id. § VIII.A. The rule also explains that discussions can take place between the program
directors and others, including judges and evaluators. Id. § VIII.B. Further, “[a]ny
information furnished under oath, whether by affidavit, testimony or otherwise, may be used
for impeachment purposes in this Court or elsewhere. Nothing in this Order is intended to
provide any protection from the criminal consequences of making a false statement under
oath.” Id. § VIII.C.
The Western District of Texas provides that ADR proceedings shall be confidential, but
does not specify whether its rule applies to arbitration and mediation but states that the
“court may approve any ADR method the parties suggest or the court believes is suited to the
litigation.” See W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CV-88(a). Rule CV-88(h) on “Confidentiality”
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided herein, or as agreed by the participants, a
communication relating to the subject matter of any civil or criminal dispute made by any
participant during an alternative dispute resolution procedure, whether before or after the
institution of formal judicial proceedings, is confidential, may not be disclosed, may not be
used as evidence against the participant in any judicial or administrative proceeding, and
does not constitute a waiver of any existing privileges or immunities.” Id. R. CV-88(h).
Further, the rule provides that any “record made at an alternative dispute resolution
procedure is confidential.” Id. R. CV-88(h)(1). However, “[a]n oral communication or
written material used in or made a part of an alternative dispute resolution procedure is
admissible or discoverable if it is admissible or discoverable independent of the procedure.”
Id. R. CV-88(h)(2). Moreover, “[i]f this section conflicts with other legal requirements for
disclosure of communications or materials, the issue of confidentiality may be presented to
the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings to determine, in camera, whether the facts,
circumstances, and context of the communications or materials sought to be disclosed
warrant a protective order of the court or whether the communications or materials are
subject to disclosure.” Id. R. CV-88(h)(3).
128
See N.D. CAL. ADR LOCAL R. 5-12 (“Early Neutral Evaluation: Confidentiality”) (also
permitting parties to stipulate to disclosures); Id. R. 6-12 (“Mediation: Confidentiality”)
(again permitting stipulated disclosures by the parties; and also permitting mediators to “ask
the parties and all persons attending the mediation to sign a confidentiality agreement on a
form provided by the court” and in commentary noting that law sometimes permits
disclosures, for example to protect against crimes or bodily harms); M.D. FLA. LOCAL R.
9.07(b) (“Restrictions on the Use of Information Derived During the Mediation
Conference”) (“All proceedings of the mediation conference, including statements made by
any party, attorney, or other participant, are privileged in all respects. The proceedings may
not be reported, recorded, placed into evidence, made known to the trial court or jury, or
construed for any purpose as an admission against interest. A party is not bound by anything
said or done at the conference, unless a settlement is reached.”); M.D.N.C. LOCAL R. 83.9e
(“Procedures for Mediated Settlement Conferences”); W.D. OKLA. L.CV.R. 16.2(f)
(providing for the confidentiality of judicial settlement conferences); id. R. 16.3(f)
(providing for the confidentiality of court-ordered mediation).
129
In the District of New Jersey, Appendix Q (“Guidelines for Mediation”) provides that:
“Neither the parties nor the mediator may disclose any information presented during the
mediation process without consent. The only exception to this rule of confidentiality is when
disclosure may be necessary to advise the compliance judge of an apparent failure to
participate in the mediation process.” D.N.J. LOCAL R. app. Q § II.B. In addition, the
Appendix explains that “appropriate sanctions may be imposed on any party or attorney who
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sometimes by referencing federal evidentiary rules that preclude admission of
information related to settlement at trial and then specifying that information
developed through court-annexed arbitration was likewise not to be admitted.130
fails to participate in a meaningful manner or to cooperate with the mediator or who
breaches confidentiality.” Id. § III. In contrast, Appendix M (“Guidelines for Arbitration”)
does not provide that arbitration shall be confidential. It does explain, however, that evidence
produced during an arbitration proceeding may only be used in limited circumstances in a de
novo trial: “[N]either the fact that the case was arbitrated nor the amount of the arbitrator’s
award is admissible. However, testimony given upon the record of the arbitration hearing
may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness at any subsequent trial de novo. In light
of the limitation placed by the Court upon the use of exhibits at subsequent Court
proceedings, the arbitrator should return all exhibits to counsel at the conclusion of the
arbitration hearing.” D.N.J. LOCAL CIV. R. app. M § III.
The rules for the Eastern District of New York address mediation as confidential and
permit mediators to ask for confidentiality agreements absent a different agreement; courtannexed arbitration is not discussed in terms of confidentiality but the evidence adduced is
not admissible at a de novo trial. See E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.8 (“Court-Annexed
Mediation”); id. R. 83.7 (“Court-Annexed Arbitration”). Moreover, the E.D.N.Y. rules
provide for parties to record the proceeding. See id. R. 83.7(f)(6) (“A party may have a
recording and transcript made of the arbitration hearing . . . .”). The rule does provide that,
should there be a trial de novo, “the Court shall not admit evidence that there had been an
arbitration proceeding, the nature or amount of the award, or any other matter concerning the
conduct of the arbitration proceeding.” Id. 83.7(h)(3).
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania local civil rule 53.3(3) provides that “[a]ll ADR
processes subject to this Rule shall be confidential, and disclosure by any person of
confidential dispute resolution communications is prohibited unless confidentiality has been
waived by all participants in the ADR process, or disclosure is ordered by the assigned judge
for good cause shown.” E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.3(3). However, Rule 53.3(7) provides
that “[n]othing in the Rule shall be construed to amend or modify the provisions of Local
Civil Rule 53.2 (compulsory and voluntary arbitration with right of trial de novo).” Id. R.
53.3(7). Rule 53.2, which governs arbitration, does not discuss confidentiality. Id. R. 53.2.
130
Federal Rule of Evidence 408 (“Compromise Offers and Negotiations”) reflected a
common law protection of negotiations, predicated on the ideas of the irrelevancy of
discussion to findings of liability and of the desirability of encouraging negotiations. FED. R.
EVID. 408. Protected are the conduct and statements made during compromise negotiations.
Amendments in 2008 specify a somewhat different approach for criminal cases. See Id. R.
408(a)(2) (indicating that “conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations
about the claim—except when offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to
a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement
authority”). Moreover, the rule provides that evidence can come in for “another purpose,
such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” Id. R. 408(b). Whether
in practice Rule 408 suffices and whether it should be more or less protective are questions.
Three courts’ local rules incorporate the Federal Rules of Evidence when discussing
arbitration proceedings. See N.D. CAL. ADR LOCAL R. 4-12(b) (“Limitation on Admission of
Evidence. At the trial de novo the Court shall not admit any evidence indicating that there
has been an arbitration proceeding, the nature or amount of any award, or any other matter
concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding, unless: (1) The evidence would
otherwise be admissible in the trial under the Federal Rules of Evidence, or (2) The parties
have otherwise stipulated.”); W.D. MICH. L.CIV.R. 16.2(d) (“Confidentiality - All ADR
proceedings are considered to be compromise negotiations within the meaning of Fed. R.
Evid. 408.”); E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 53.2(7)(C) (“At the trial de novo, the court shall not
admit evidence that there had been an arbitration trial, the nature or amount of the award, or
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To expand the analysis, we undertook a broader search of local rules that
included districts beyond the initial ten identified in the 1988 statute on courtannexed arbitration. As noted, in 1998 revisions to the 1988 statute, Congress
provided an expanded mandate for ADR, altered its requirements somewhat for
court-annexed arbitration, and authorized its use in any district complying with
the requirements.131 That review yielded about thirty districts in which, as of
2014, rules could be read to permit court-annexed arbitration.132 Inquiries
identified eight districts (including the three noted in the discussion of the 1988
legislation, above) that had programs for court-annexed arbitration. Use varied
widely, from districts in which hundreds of cases went through its program
yearly to those in which no court-annexed arbitrations had been held.133

any other matter concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding unless the evidence
would otherwise be admissible in the Court under the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
131
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-315, 112 Stat. 2993
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–658 (2012)). See 28 U.S.C. § 651 for authorization of dispute
resolution processes.
132
See Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration, supra note 13, at 2.
This list of thirty was culled from tables provided through an FJC review of “local rules,
general orders, CJRA plans, internal operating procedures, web sites, and any other written
source” on a district’s ADR procedures. See STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 3–4.
The Stienstra review suggested that fifty districts could have some kind of arbitration
program. We reduced the number to thirty by eliminating districts that reference arbitration
but do not have programs, and conducted telephone interviews to confirm that court-annexed
arbitration programs exist. Examples of districts with rules that we did not include in the
thirty in which staff were contacted are E.D. CAL. LOCAL R. 271(a)(1) (“It is the Court’s
intention [to] allow the participants to take advantage of a wide variety of alternative dispute
resolution methods. These methods may include, but are not limited to, mediation,
negotiation, early neutral evaluation, and settlement facilitation. The specific method or
methods employed will be determined by the Neutral and the parties and may vary from
matter to matter.”); S.D. CAL. CIV. R. 16.1(c)(2) (“If no settlement is reached at the [Early
Neutral Evaluation] conference, the judicial officer may . . . [d]iscuss the parties’ willingness
to agree to non-binding arbitration or mediation within forty-five (45) days (1) in any case
where the judicial officer believes arbitration or mediation might result in a cost-effective
resolution of the lawsuit, or (2) in any case where the parties have indicated an interest in
arbitration or mediation.”); D. COLO. L.CIV.R. 16.6(a) (“A district judge or a magistrate
judge exercising consent jurisdiction may direct the parties to engage in an early neutral
evaluation or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding.”); D.S.D. LOCAL R. 53.1
(“Alternative Dispute Resolution: Parties are encouraged to use alternative dispute resolution
procedures to try to settle their cases without a trial. Magistrate judges are available as
mediators to facilitate alternative dispute resolution procedures.”); N.D. GA. CIV. LOCAL R.
16.7(B)(1) (“A judge may in his or her discretion refer any civil case to a non-binding ADR
process, e.g. early neutral evaluation, mediation, or non-binding arbitration. Upon the
consent of the parties, the judge may refer any civil case to binding arbitration, binding
summary jury trial or bench trial, or other binding ADR process.” However, the rules also
state that “[t]his program has not been funded by Congress and will not be implemented until
funded.” R. 16.7(B)(2)).
133
Interviews conducted in April of 2014 provide some insight into frequency of courtannexed arbitrations. The District of New Jersey, Eastern District of New York, and the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania reported robust court-annexed arbitration programs: staff
described such arbitrations as “not unusual” in the District of New Jersey, and noted that
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Honing in on this set of eight, we sought to understand whether the public
was permitted to attend court-annexed arbitrations or whether the general
reference in the 1998 act to the confidentiality of ADR processes, coupled with
other sources, has been read to preclude observers, including when arbitration
hearings were held in courtrooms. A mix of reading rules and discussions with
court staff yielded the conclusion that, as of 2014, court-annexed arbitrations
were or would be private (if held) in five federal district courts,134 and open to
the public in three,135 including in two districts reporting hundreds of courtannexed arbitrations yearly.136
they took place about 180 times a year in the Eastern District of New York, and 784 times in
2013 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
In contrast, staff in one district—the Western District of Missouri—described such
proceedings as “rare” or “very rare,” or that none had taken place in the past year. In the
District of Delaware, staff estimated similarly low frequency—5 or 6 times in the past 20
years; staff in the District of Idaho reported about 5 court-annexed arbitrations in the past 10
years. In the District of Connecticut, the program had operated from 1978 until about 1982,
D. CONN. LOCAL R. 28 (not in use) (on file with author), and no court-annexed arbitrations
had taken place for more than twenty years. Interview with Janet Hall, Chief Judge, D. Conn.
(June 2015); Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration, supra note 13, at
5–6.
134
Two districts’ local rules—in the Western District of Missouri and the Western District
of Pennsylvania—specified that sessions were private. See MAP General Order, W.D. Mo.,
supra note 125, § VIII.A (“This Court shall treat as confidential all written and oral
communications, not under oath, made in connection with or during any Program session
except as otherwise noted in this Section.”); W.D. PA., ADR POLICIES & PROCEDURES § 6(A)
(“Except as provided in subsection D of this Section 6, this Court, the ADR Coordinator, all
neutrals, all counsel, all parties and any other person who participates (in person or by
telephone) in (i) any ADR process described in Sections 1 through 5 of these Policies and
Procedures, or (ii) any private ADR process pursuant to Court order, shall treat as
‘confidential information’ (i) the contents of all documents created for or by the neutral, (ii)
all communications and conduct during the ADR process, and (iii) all ‘communications in
connection with’ the ADR process.”).
In three other districts—the Middle District of Georgia, District of Idaho, and Eastern
District of New York—clerks informed students working on this project that sessions were
private. See Telephone Interview by Mark Kelley with Holly McCarra, Arbitration Clerk,
Middle Dist. of Ga. (Apr. 2014); Telephone Interview by Devon Porter with Susie Headlee,
ADR/Pro Bono Coordinator, Dist. of Idaho (Apr. 14, 2014); Telephone Interview by Devon
Porter with Rita Credle, Arbitration Clerk, E. Dist. of N.Y. (Apr. 24, 2014). As noted, the
Northern District of California has not held arbitrations but staff commented that, were they
to be held, they would be private. Interview by Chris Milione with Tim Smagacz, ADR
Program Adm’r, N. Dist. of Cal. (Apr. 23, 2014).
135
See Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Mary Pat Thynge, Chief Magistrate
Judge, Dist. of Del. (Apr. 17, 2014); Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Jim
Quinlan, Arbitration Clerk, Dist. of N.J. (Apr. 9, 2014); Telephone Interview by Chris
Milione with Michael E. Kunz, Clerk of the Court, E. Dist. of Pa. (Apr. 11, 2014). The Clerk
of the Court of the Eastern District also explained that requiring arbitration proceedings to
take place in a courtroom, open to the public, was meant in part to lend dignity to the
proceedings. Id.
136
See STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 15 tbl.7. Stienestra reported that 2,799 cases had been
referred to arbitration in her review of forty-nine federal district courts in a year period
ending June 30, 2011; the District of New Jersey recorded 1,668 court-annexed arbitrations
and the Eastern District of Pennsylvania listed 826 court-annexed arbitrations. Id. at app. 5.
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The decision about where to hold an arbitration may be influenced by the
economics of programs for court-annexed arbitration. Unlike judges, resident in
courthouses, court-annexed arbitrators are often practicing lawyers, who may
be paid between $150 to $250 per arbitration. Convening the proceeding in that
lawyer’s office can be time-saving for that arbitrator, even as it makes public
access to the proceeding functionally implausible.
In addition to looking at rules in particular jurisdictions, other routes into
learning about whether the public has a place in ADR was through research on
ADR and on model rules for ADR. In 2011, the Federal Judicial Center
published an overview to provide an “initial report” on district court
practices.137 That monograph detailed what kinds of programs federal district
courts offered as ADR, how references to ADR were made, the neutrals
deployed, and the funding for such proceedings. The report did not include
discussion of where ADR procedures took place or of who could attend.138
Another overview comes from an entity called Resolution Systems
Institute (“RSI”), supported in part by the private ADR-provider JAMS (once
the acronym for that group’s name—Judicial Arbitration and Mediation
Services). RSI has created a database to provide a guide on state and federal
rules and search tools for court-based ADR.139 Like the FJC’s 2011 overview,
the RSI materials do not use “the public” or “access to ADR proceedings” as
discrete topics of analysis. To locate rules addressing the participants in ADR,
we searched the database using terms such as “attendance” and

137

STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 4–15, app. 5. As noted, we used this monograph to identify
the thirty jurisdictions that might provide court-annexed arbitration. See supra note 132.
138
STIENSTRA, supra note 97, at 4–15, app. 5.
139
See Court ADR Across the U.S., RESOL. SYS. INST. (2015), http://courtadr.org
/court-adr-across-the-us/search.php, archived at http://perma.cc/MA84-ZYYM (last visited
May 27, 2015). This guide offers a searchable database for both state and federal ADR
resources, with separate inputs for Resource Type (such as “Academic Program,” “Advisory
Opinion,” “Article,” and “Audiotape”), Case Type (such as “Administrative,” “Adult
Guardianship,” “Aging - Elderly,” and “Agriculture”), Process Type (such as “Arbitration,”
“Case Evaluation,” “Case Management,” and “Collaborative Law”), and Topics Covered
(such as “Access to Justice,” “ADR Orientation,” “Advanced Degree Program,” and
“Advocacy”), as well as inputs for Scope (State or Federal) and Court Type (Trial,
Appellate, Supreme) and a scroll-box for State. The database itself does not provide a list of
which federal court rules are included. By scrolling down on the search page and searching
for “Federal” scope while leaving all other categories unmarked, the database referenced
eighty-nine federal districts. Included were the districts in all of the states (except the
Western District of Oklahoma) and the D.C. district court; excluded were rules for Guam,
Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Northern Mariana Islands. See id. Through discussions with
RSI staff, we learned that its focus was on the states and hence federal district courts in
states. The staff at RSI assembles the materials and then culls rules to limit its database to
rules directly related to court ADR. Interview by Benjamin Woodring with Mary Novak,
Dir., RSI Res. Ctr., (Sept. 17, 2014).
The page on RSI’s history indicates it has received some support from the JAMS
Foundation. History 2011–2012, RESOL. SYS. INST., http://www.aboutrsi.org/history
.php?ID=13 (last visited May 27, 2015).
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“confidentiality,”140 and found many state rules about maintaining
confidentiality, often referencing mediation.141 In addition, some rules required
140

For example, by searching Resource Type: “Rules - Court”; unmarked Case Type;
Process Type: “Arbitration”; and Topics Covered: “Attendance”, we found forty-six
mentions of attendance, of which twenty-six were from state courts (at the county or state
level) and twenty were from federal courts.
Reviewing the rules on arbitration for state courts, two of these states expressly limit
non-party attendance at ADR. See N.D. R. CT. 8.8(d) (“The ADR processes are confidential
and not open to the public.”); S.C. ADR R. 5(d) (“ADR conferences are private. Other
persons may attend only with the permission of the parties, their attorneys and the
mediator.”).
Two provide confidentiality requirements generally for ADR. See ME. R. CIV. PROC.
16B(k) (“A neutral who conducts an alternative dispute resolution conference pursuant to
this rule, or an alternative dispute resolution process pursuant to subsection (b)(6), shall not,
without the informed written consent of the parties, disclose the outcome or disclose any
conduct, statements, or other information acquired at or in connection with the ADR
conference.”); MO. 11TH CIR. CT. R. 38.6 (“The proceedings [ADR] shall be private,
confidential, and regarded as settlement negotiations as provided in Supreme Court Rules
17.05 and 17.06. No stenographic, electronic or other record of an A.D.R. process shall be
made.”).
One state provides a confidentiality provision explicitly for arbitration. See GA. SUP.
CT. ADR R. VII.A (“Unless a court’s ADR rules provide otherwise, the confidentiality
herein applies to non-binding arbitration conferences as well. A written and executed
agreement or memorandum of agreement resulting from a court-annexed or court-referred
ADR process is not subject to the confidentiality described above.”).
Three jurisdictions focus on the inadmissibility, in subsequent proceedings, of certain
information gained from arbitration. See CAL. STANISLAUS CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. 3.06 (citing
CAL. EVID. CODE § 703.5, which states, “no arbitrator or mediator, shall be competent to
testify, in any subsequent civil proceeding, as to any statement, conduct, decision, or ruling,
occurring at or in conjunction with the prior proceeding”); N.D. R. CT. 8.8(d) (“When
persons agree to conduct and participate in ADR processes for the purpose of compromising,
settling, or resolving a dispute, evidence of anything said or of any admission made in the
course of the ADR processes is inadmissible as evidence and disclosure of confidential ADR
communications is prohibited, except as authorized by the court and agreed to by the parties
or as permitted under N.D.C.C. §§ 31-04-11 and 14-09.1-06.”); HAW. CIRCUIT CT. R. 12.2(f)
(“Unless the parties otherwise agree in writing or it is otherwise authorized and approved by
the adjudicating court pursuant to the Uniform Mediation Act or other law, the neutral,
counsel, the parties, and other participants in any mediation [or arbitration, by implication of
Rule 12.2(a)], shall not communicate with the civil court adjudicating the merits of the
mediated matter (including the settlement or trial judge) about the substance of any position,
offer, or other matter related to mediation, nor shall a court request or order disclosure of
such information unless such disclosure is required to enforce a settlement agreement,
adjudicate a dispute over mediator fees, or provide evidence in any attorney disciplinary
proceeding, and then only to the extent required to accomplish such purpose. However, the
neutral may disclose to a court whether the ADR process is concluded or terminated; who
attended; and, if applicable, whether a settlement or resolution was reached with regard to
some or all issues presented.”).
Two jurisdictions require complaints against arbitrators to remain confidential until the
complaint has been resolved. See CAL. S.F. CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. 4.1(E)(2)(e) (“All complaint
procedures and complaint proceedings shall be kept confidential. No information or records
regarding the receipt, investigation, or resolution of a complaint may be open to the public or
disclosed outside the course of the complaint proceeding except as provided in Rule
4.1E.2.(d)(5) above [“After the decision on a complaint, the Presiding Judge or his/her
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that grievances filed against arbitrators be confidential, at least until decisions
were made about them.142
designee may authorize public disclosure of the name of the ADR panel member against
whom action has been taken, the action taken, and the general basis on which the action was
taken.”] or as otherwise required by law.”); CAL. STANISLAUS CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. 3.14(I)
(“Except as provided in paragraphs (C) [memorandum record of frivolous complaint] and
(G) [complainant to be notified about receipt and disposition of complaint], all papers filed
and proceedings conducted on a complaint against a mediator, arbitrator or neutral evaluator
should be confidential until disciplinary action is ordered by the court.”).
Two jurisdictions have other specifications. See CAL. CONTRA COSTA CNTY. SUPER. CT.
R. 3.202(e) (allowing parties to select non-essential attendees, stating: “As long as all trial
attorneys, parties, and other people needed to present the case and answer the arbitrator’s
questions are included, the parties may choose who will attend arbitration”); D.C. SUPER. CT.
R. CIV. ARB. IV(b) (requiring that the selection procedure for arbitrators remain open to the
public, stating: “The parties may agree among themselves to select a particular arbitrator
from a roster of eligible arbitrators provided by the Multi-Door Division. Otherwise, when a
Judge assigns a case to arbitration an arbitrator shall be assigned pursuant to procedures
designated by the Presiding Judge of the Civil Division. The Multi-Door Division shall make
available to the public copies of the current assignment procedures.”).
Many states provide specific confidentiality provisions for mediation or judicial
settlement conferences. See, e.g., OHIO CUYAHOGA CNTY. COMMON PLEAS CT. LOCAL R.
21.2(E)(9) (“The entire mediation process is confidential.”); WASH. PIERCE CNTY. SUPER. CT.
LOCAL R. 16(c)(2)(C) (“Proceedings of the settlement conferences shall, in all respects, be
privileged and not reported or recorded. Without disclosing any communications made at the
settlement conference, the settlement conference Judicial Officer may advise the assigned
judicial department in writing as to whether the use of further or alternative dispute
resolution procedures, or the appointment of additional investigators or the development of
additional evidence would be advisable prior to trial.”).
Thirteen state court rules provide confidentiality provisions for mediation or judicial
settlements but do not expressly address confidentiality and attendance of non-parties at
arbitration. See CAL. SAN DIEGO CNTY. SUPER. CT. R. Div. II, Ch. 3; MO. 22D CIR. CT. R.
38.10; N.M. 3D DIST. CT. LOCAL R. 3-704(B)(11); N.Y. WESTCHESTER CNTY. ADR R. 5; N.C.
MECKLENBERG CNTY. FAM. ADR R. exhibit D; N.C. DIST. CT. 17B FAM. CT. DIV.
SETTLEMENT R. 11.3; N.C. IREDELL CNTY. ADR R. 5(E); N.C. SUP. CT. FAM. SETTLEMENT R.
4(D); N.C. SUPER. CT. MSC R. 4(F); OHIO CUYAHOGA CNTY. COMMON PLEAS CT. R. 21.2;
OHIO LUCAS CNTY. COMMON P LEAS CT. R. 6.01(E); OHIO RICHLAND CNTY. COMMON P LEAS
CT. R. 2.02; WASH. PIERCE CNTY. SUPER. CT. LOCAL R. 16(c).
141
Many rules, for example, include a definition of “ADR” as including arbitration,
mediation, mini-trials, and other procedures, but go on to describe only the specific rules and
procedures that apply to mediation.
142
Examples of provisions making grievances against either mediators or arbitrators
confidential (up to a point when sanctions are imposed or other screenings) include N.D. R.
CT. 8.9 (g)(6) (“Unless and until sanctions are imposed, all [materials arising out of a]
complaint [against mediators] shall be confidential” unless waived); CAL. S.F. CNTY. SUPER.
CT. R. 4.1(E)(2)(d)(5), (e) (“All complaint procedures and complaint proceedings shall be
kept confidential. No information or records regarding the receipt, investigation, or
resolution of a complaint may be open to the public or disclosed outside the course of the
complaint proceeding” until after “the decision on a complaint, the Presiding Judge or
his/her designee may authorize public disclosure of the name of the ADR panel member
against whom action has been taken, the action taken, and the general basis on which the
action was taken,” or “as otherwise required by law”); CAL. STANISLAUS CNTY. SUPER. CT.
R. 3.14(I) (“[A]ll papers filed and proceedings conducted on a complaint against a mediator,
arbitrator or neutral evaluator should be confidential until disciplinary action is ordered by
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Another way to look for a public dimension of ADR is through the model
acts on ADR promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”), whose
impact is reflected in many of the rules described above. In 2000, the ULC
replaced its 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act; the 2000 Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act has been enacted in seventeen states and the District of
Columbia.143 The Uniform Mediation Act, completed in 2001 and amended in
2003, has been adopted by eleven states and the District of Columbia.144
The Prefatory Note for the Mediation Act explains that “a central thrust of
the Act is to provide a privilege that assures confidentiality in legal

the court.”); MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114 App.: Code of Ethics Enforcement Procedure § IV.A
(“Unless and until final sanctions are imposed, all files, records, and proceedings of the
Board that relate to or arise out of any complaint shall be confidential [with limited
exceptions].”); S.C. REG. FOR THE COMM. ON ADR V(D)(10)(a) (“Except as otherwise
provided in the ADR Rules and these Regulations or ordered by the Supreme Court, all
complaints, proceedings, records, information or orders relating to an allegation of
misconduct shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed to the public.”); see also GA. SUP.
CT. ADR R. app. C, ch. 2 § III(A), (C) (providing that a “mere grievance” be kept
confidential unless and until a complaint is “forwarded” to an Ethics Committee).
The relevant federal statute provides that individuals “serving as arbitrators” under
court-run programs have “the immunities and protections that the law accords to persons
serving” that “quasi-judicial” function. See 28 U.S.C. § 655(c). Local federal rules reiterate
the provisions. See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIV. R. 83.7(c) (“Immunity of Arbitrators.
Arbitrators shall be immune from liability or suit with respect to their conduct as such to the
maximum extent permitted by applicable law.”); Id. R. 83.8(g) (applying immunity to
mediators); N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. PRAC. 83.11-5(d)(6). Turning then to judicial discipline,
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–360, allegations against federal judges for misbehavior are not made
public by the courts unless certain sanctions are imposed by the Judicial Conference. 28
U.S.C.§ 355(b)(1) (requiring House of Representatives and Clerk of the House of
Representatives to “make available to the public the determination and any reasons for the
determination” of the judicial council that consideration of impeachment of an Article III
judge may be warranted). The provision does not bar (nor might it be able to, under First
Amendment doctrine) complainants from making their concerns public.
States have parallel provisions. See, e.g., MONT. CT. R. ARB. FEE DISPUTES 9.2. An
example of a provision applying immunity to those staff evaluating the complaint
proceedings against a mediator is N.D. R. CT. 8.9(g)(7)(B) (“Board members and staff are
immune from suit for any conduct in the course of their official duties [in the ethics
enforcement procedure].”).
143
The Uniform Arbitration Act has been enacted in Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, and
West Virginia, and in 2015 was introduced in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. See
Legislative Fact Sheet—Arbitration Act (2000), UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Arbitration%20Act%20(2000)
(last visited June 30, 2015).
144
The Act has been adopted in the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and
Washington. See Legislative Fact Sheet—Mediation Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Mediation%20Act (last visited
June 30, 2015).
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proceedings.”145 In contrast, the Uniform Arbitration Act does not include a
provision on confidentiality; a comment on judicial enforcement of arbitral
awards reminds users that “[b]ecause of the involvement of important legal
rights, a court should review more carefully claims of confidentiality, trade
secrets, privilege, or other matters protected from disclosure than other
assertions that a preaward order of an arbitrator is invalid.”146
In short, research into the rule structures of the different kinds of ADR
demonstrates both the breadth of regulation and the invisibility of the public as
a category in need of attention. While a few rules provide for inclusion, more
often implicit mention is made of exclusion through obligations of
confidentiality. To the extent that the public emerged, the context was generally
to insulate mediations and settlement discussions from disclosure. Finding
affirmative clear rules on public access to ADR proceedings is difficult.
On the other hand, court-annexed arbitration, as practiced in some of the
high-volume jurisdictions, exemplifies the capacity for ADR to include a public
dimension. In Illinois, arbitrations are open and often conducted in courthouses
or special centers,147 and the outcomes become part of a court-created
database.148 An example from the federal system comes from the federal
145

UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note (2003). The act also notes that state laws regulating
the confidentiality of proceedings may have an impact, as it provides for references to
transparency requirements, by offering square brackets—as in this quote—to reference the
possibility of statutory obligations of open process. See id. § 8 (“CONFIDENTIALITY.
Unless subject to the [insert statutory references to open meetings act and open records act],
mediation communications are confidential to the extent agreed by the parties or provided by
other law or rule of this State.”).
146
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 18 cmt. 1 (2000), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org
/shared/docs/arbitration/arbitration_final_00.pdf.
147
See, e.g., ANN B. JORGENSEN & HOLLIS L. WEBSTER, STATE OF ILL., CNTY. OF DUPAGE
COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY ARBITRATION PROGRAM, ARBITRATOR’S BENCH BOOK 13–14
(3d rev. 2011), available at http://www.dupageco.org/Courts/Docs/34145/. According to a
telephone interview with the 18th circuit arbitration administrator, arbitration hearings are
public in all counties in Illinois. Telephone Interview by Chris Milione with Loretta Glenny,
Arbitration Admin., Ill. 18th Judicial Dist. (Sept. 29, 2014). The proceedings take place
either in courthouses that sometimes have “Mandatory Arbitration Centers” or the
proceedings are held in other buildings. ILLINOIS UNIFORM ARBITRATOR REFERENCE
MANUAL, supra note 95, at 8; Locations and Contact Information, CIRCUIT CT.
COOK COUNTY, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/aboutthecourt/OfficeoftheChiefJudge/Court
RelatedServices/MandatoryArbitration/LocationsandContactInformation.aspx, archived at
http://perma.cc/GL6M-2PXN. The rules of the Supreme Court of Illinois are not clear on
public access. The comment to Illinois’s supreme court rule regarding scheduling arbitration
hearings explains that the “use of courthouse facilities provides a desirable quasi-judicial
atmosphere” and centralization offers efficiencies as well as monitoring of the progress of
cases. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 88 cmt.
148
Posted reports from 2004 to 2011 can be found on the Illinois courts’ websites. See
Court-Annexed Mandatory Arbitration Annual Reports, ILL. CTS., http://www.state.il.us
/court/Administrative/ManArb/default.asp, archived at http://perma.cc/L984-J7VJ. Further,
as noted supra note 95, Illinois’ mandatory arbitration is akin to abbreviated trials. As of
2011, 41,302 cases were referred to arbitration; about three-quarters were settled or
dismissed prior to arbitration, and about 600 of those that did arbitrate proceeded from
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district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which also locates its
arbitrations in open courtrooms in its courthouse.149 In addition, rules
occasionally mention the possibility of creating a stenographic record of a
court-annexed arbitration.150 Yet even in these instances, local rules do not
always make clear that the proceedings are open. More generally, as currently
constituted, court-based ADR does little to build publicity into the new
processes that it promotes, even as those processes are located in and
increasingly equated with what courts “do.”151
VII. VALUING PUBLICITY: CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES
AND REGULATORY OBLIGATIONS
I have mapped the changing content over hundreds of years in the “values
and goals” of procedural systems. The idea of expansive rights of access—to
bring claims to courts and to watch courts—came to be secured during the past
three centuries. Constitutional texts enshrine “open courts” and “public trials”
as obligations, and the political ideology of one’s “day in court,” “rights to
court,” and right to “open courts” continues to hold sway in popular discourse,
awash with media presentations of trials. Yet the practices that anchor the idea
arbitration to trial. See SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS, COURT-ANNEXED MANDATORY
ARBITRATION: ANNUAL REPORT TO THE ILLINOIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY FOR STATE FISCAL
YEAR 2011, at 5 (2011), available at http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb
/2011/ManArbRpt11.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9FDM-BK9H.
149
See Kelly, Milione & Porter, Memo, Court-Annexed Arbitration, supra note 13, at 3. The
location of court-annexed arbitration in courtrooms ought not to be equated with public
access; as staff explained, in some districts, courtrooms may be used, while the proceedings
are nonetheless closed to the public.
150
See, e.g., N.C. IREDELL CNTY. ADR R. 5(f) (“There shall be no record made of any ADR
proceedings under these Rules, unless the parties have agreed to binding arbitration, in
which case any party may request that a record be made.”); MONT. CT. R. ARB. FEE DISPUTES
7.9 (providing that either party can, at its own expense, “have the entire proceeding recorded
by a court report or by mechanical means,” and if so, that the other party has a right to the
transcript if bearing the expense of obtaining one.); ILLINOIS UNIFORM ARBITRATOR
REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 95, at 12 (explaining that a court reporter is not provided
but parties may arrange for stenographic records at their own expense); cf. MO., 11TH CIR.
CT. R. 38.6, providing that “[n]o stenographic, electronic, or other record of an A.D.R.
process shall be made,” and including arbitration in Rule 38.1(2) as an “A.D.R. program”. In
contrast, Utah provides that records of proceedings “shall be destroyed at such time as an
award becomes final or upon a demand for a trial de novo.” See UTAH R. COURT-ANNEXED
ADR 102(g).
151
The process of reaching agreement is, however, distinct from the agreements made;
keeping outcomes confidential requires different arguments about one or more of the parties’
interests in nondisclosure—to avoid, for example, others bringing similar claims or people
knowing about funds received. Law sometimes intervenes, based on what is often termed the
public’s “need to know,” to insist on “sunshine.” For example, the Fair Labor Standards Act
provides that settlements not be sealed—animated in part by the view that similarly-situated
co-workers would benefit from the information and employers ought not be able to impose
silence as the price of a settlement. Some states require that medical malpractice payments
over a certain amount be posted on the web. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 456.041(4) (West Supp.
2015) (requiring reporting of payments of malpractice claims that exceed $100,000).
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of courts as “open” are on the wane. While substantial energies have been
directed to reformatting court-based procedures, those efforts have generally
not inscribed a place for the public.
The question that emerges is the relationship of constitutional open-court
obligations to the privatizing modes of government-based, non-trial
adjudication, quasi-adjudication, and mediated dispute resolution. Below I
provide an account of the law, followed by an analysis of what law could
mandate and why. The doctrine puts into sharp relief the stakes of procedural
rule changes, revising the experiences of courts in service of particular logics.
The federal law of open courts starts with the Sixth Amendment, which
guarantees criminal defendants a “speedy and public trial” before a jury drawn
from the “district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”152 Judges
interpret this Sixth Amendment guarantee when addressing the legality of the
exclusion of the public in criminal proceedings from the vantage point of the
defendant.153 (Article III, rarely referenced in open-court law, references that
no person can be convicted of treason unless on the “Testimony of two
Witnesses . . . or on Confession in open Court.”154) In addition, in cases
brought by the press and the public seeking to attend criminal proceedings,
judges discuss public rights of audience based on First Amendment speech,
assembly, and petition rights;155 Seventh Amendment civil jury rights; and
common law English and American practices. State constitutions offer
additional bases through their textual guarantees of “open courts.”
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled directly on access to civil trials
and related proceedings, the Court’s jurisprudence in the criminal context—
requiring public access for trials, voir dire, and pre-trial suppression
hearings156—has prompted lower court judges to conclude that civil
proceedings are presumptively open. Using a mix of constitutional and
common law doctrine, circuit courts have found constitutional access rights to
civil trials, to related court-based proceedings, and in some circuits, to most of
the documents filed in court.157
152

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See, e.g., Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (2010).
154
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.
155
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501 (1984);
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Judith Resnik, Due Process:
A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987); discussion infra notes 157–77 and
accompanying text. The Sixth Amendment right of the defendant is sometimes said to
produce a right—or the “freedom” of the public to “listen.” See Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 576.
156
See Presley, 558 U.S. 209; Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). Simonson analyzed
the uneven application of these rulings in the lower courts. Simonson, supra note 56, at
2195–96.
157
A list of the circuits, as of 2013, which had found access rights to civil trials is provided
in Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014). See also Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750
F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684
153
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The test commonly deployed is that “[a] proceeding qualifies for the First
Amendment right of public access”158 when “there has been a tradition of
accessibility” to that proceeding and when “access plays a significant positive
role in the functioning of the particular process in question.”159 Thus, when a
closure is challenged, current doctrine charges judges with assessing the history
of a given proceeding (experience) and examining the utilities of openness or
closure (logic).160 If a proceeding qualifies as open, the next decision is whether
special considerations justify a narrowly tailored closure.
As discussed, the practices of adjudication have been transformed over the
last two centuries, and courthouses have expanded accordingly. Early
courthouses, such as that in Fulton County, New York, were a single room;
today, courtrooms can be less than ten percent of the footprint of a courthouse,
and judges do much of their work off the bench—on the phone or in meetings
in their chambers.161 Indeed, a recent study found a “steady year-over-year
decline in total courtroom hours” from 2008 to 2012 that continued into 2013.
Federal judges spent less than two hours a day on average in the courtroom, or
about “423 hours of open court proceedings per active district judge”
annually.162 As a consequence, an account of the history of “place and
process”163 requires acknowledging that the “judgment of experience”164 is

F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2011)); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir.
1984) (“We hold that the First Amendment does secure a right of access to civil
proceedings.”); In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding a
right of access to litigation committee reports in shareholder derivative suits); Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983)
(holding that the First Amendment limits judicial discretion to seal documents in a civil
case)). Access to documents—at least those deemed “judicial” documents filed in civil cases
as part of lawsuits—has likewise received protection. See United States v. Erie Cnty., 763
F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014); Courthouse News Serv., 750 F. 3d 776; Hartford Courant Co. v.
Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
158
Strine, 733 F.3d at 514.
159
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).This
test was developed from Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, in
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 584–98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
160
The Third Circuit explained: “Under the experience prong of the experience and logic
test, we ‘consider whether “the place and process have historically been open to the press
and general public,” because such a “tradition of accessibility implies the favorable
judgment of experience.” ’ ” Strine, 733 F.3d at 515 (quoting N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2002), which in turn quoted Press-Enterprise II, 478
U.S. at 8).
161
D. Brock Hornby, The Business of the U.S. District Courts, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 453, 462
(2007).
162
See Singer & Young, supra note 74, at 565–67.
163
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.
164
Id. A related point is whether the historical record needs to be “unbroken.” See Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 18–21, Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1551
(2014) (No. 13-869), 2014 WL 262086, cert. denied [hereinafter Strine Petition for
Certiorari].
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uncoupling the ready equation of judges and courts with work in open
courtrooms.
The evaluation of the logic prong requires deciding whether “access plays
a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in
question.”165 One answer could be to return to (or to collapse logic into) the
“judgment of experience”166: if those conducting court-annexed arbitration, for
example, make the process private, one could rely on that experience as the
basis for keeping the procedures closed. The troubling circularity—turning
what is into what ought to be—is not the kind of logic that logicians admire, let
alone normative theorists looking for criteria by which to decide how to assess
new procedures.
Alternatively, the “logic” of public processes could be independent of
history—grounded in empirical arguments that public proceedings do, in
identified circumstances, produce useful results or in normative views of the
contributions of openness. With or without data, deciding whether openness
plays a “significant positive role” entails choosing a vantage point—individual
litigants, courts, the public, or social welfare more generally—from which to
take that measurement, as well as deciding on what counts as a “positive”
value.
If the goal is dispositions and if both disputants and commentators argue
(or demonstrate) that confidentiality facilitates resolutions, then closure plays a
“significant positive role.” If one offers Benthamite claims of public education
and of the disciplinary force that observers impose on judges and litigants, then
closure has a negative impact. If, as I have argued, public courts provide
opportunities to practice the democratic norms of respectful engagement in
conflicts about what justness requires, then open courts serve as one of
democracy’s sites, not to be closed off.167 In short, choices abound about which
values to adopt; which perspectives to privilege; what empirics to use to shape
the cost/benefit analysis and how to weigh the tradeoffs and marginal utilities;
and whether to embrace or rebuff utilitarian accounts.
Returning to the case law, judges—occasionally referencing Bentham168—
regularly deploy his concerns, as they posit that openness supports informed
discussions of government, fosters perceptions of fairness, checks corruption,
enhances performance, facilitates accountability, discourages fraud, and
165

Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.
The Court looked to whether the “particular type of government processing had
historically been open in our free society.” PG Publ’g Co. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 108 (3d
Cir. 2013).
167
RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 48, at 288–337; Judith Resnik, Bring Back Bentham:
“Open Courts,” “Terror Trials,” and Public Sphere(s), 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. art. 1, at
52 (2011).
168
See, e.g., In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271 (1948); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 566, 569–70 (1980). The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers,
cited here, was written by Chief Justice Burger.
166
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permits communities to vent emotions.169 When doing so, judges use a loose
amalgam of empirical claims and normative assessments, often without
delineating or specifying the criteria for either.
Discussions of a few cases illustrate the application of the doctrine and the
challenges posed by court-based ADR. A 1980s state court ruling offers one
example of the judiciary’s willingness to reject even long-standing practice in
favor of public access to criminal proceedings. At that time, the rule in New
York, “almost universally applied,” was to close and lock courtroom doors
when a judge charged a jury in a criminal case.170 The proffered rationale was
to protect jurors from distraction.171 Yet an intermediate appellate bench ruled
that “however hoary and time-honored such a practice may be,” it did not pass
constitutional muster because of the centrality of public trials in generating
confidence in courts.172
In October of 2014, another effort at closure—this time of civil
proceedings—was rebuffed. The issue was the legality of “forcible cell
extractions” of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, who were taken from their cells
and placed in restraints to be force-fed. Abu Wa’el Dhiab sought to enjoin the
U.S. government from doing so, and the government filed a motion to seal the
hearing on the preliminary injunction.173 District Judge Gladys Kessler rejected
the request. The judge quoted the 1984 ruling in Press-Enterprise I, which
stated that:
The value of openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending
trials [and other proceedings] can have confidence that standards of fairness are
being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone is free to attend gives assurance
that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become
known. Openness thus enhances both the basic fairness of the . . . trial and the
appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system.174

In a related decision about access to videotapes that had been sealed, the
district court further explained that limits on access had to be justified by an
“overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve

169

United States v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 787 F.2d 111, 114 (3d Cir. 1986)).
170
New York v. Venters, 511 N.Y.S. 2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
171
Id. at 284.
172
Id. at 283–85.
173
Memorandum Opinion to the Order Denying Government’s Motion to Close Hearing,
Dhiab v. Obama, No. 05-1457(GK), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140049 (D.D.C. Oct. 2, 2014).
A related request, on the unsealing twenty-eight videotapes, was decided on October 3, 2014
and is discussed infra notes 175–177. In November of 2014, the district court denied the
petitioner’s preliminary injunction motion (as modified as the “Government had taken
several positive actions which responded to his complaints”). Memorandum Opinion to the
Order Denying Petitioner’s Application for Preliminary Injunction, Dhiab, docket item no.
366, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2014).
174
Memorandum Opinion to the Order Denying Government’s Motion to Close Hearing,
Dhiab, 2014 WL 4942239, at *3 (alterations in original).
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higher values.”175 Judge Kessler explained that the law requires the government
to specify what information required protection, and why, when it attempted to
seal court records relating to Guantánamo Bay litigants.176 Even in the context
of claims for security, the court held that generic sealing was not appropriate,
and that, instead, tailored rationales for narrow categories of closure requests
were required.177
The videotape sealing question is illustrative of the issues raised when the
closure of court-based adjudication moves across a spectrum from the
convention of trials and court-based proceedings to a variety of newly
fashioned processes. These variations have prompted judges to reflect on
access rights to “trials and related proceedings” in contexts blurring the line
between courts and their alternatives.178 In 2011, for example, the Second
Circuit considered the limited access accorded to proceedings conducted by the
New York City Transit Authority (“NYCTA”), which had come to function as
a low-level, criminal court. When individuals failed to pay fares, jumped
turnstiles, or were otherwise misbehaving in the New York City transit system,
the NYCTA issued notices of violations, totaling in one year about 125,000.179
Of that number, some 20,000 citations were contested at in-person hearings in
which Transit Authority officers (lawyers appointed by the Authority’s
President and paid per-diem) presided.180
175

Memorandum Opinion to the Order Granting Intervenors’ Motion to Unseal Videotapes,
Dhiab, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140684, at *8 (D.D.C. Oct. 3, 2014) (citing Press-Enterprise
Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
176
Id. at *9.
177
Id. at *10–11. The district court watched the videos, reviewed the government arguments
for sealing, and held that the videos had to be unsealed, with some specific conditions. Id. at
18–29.
178
Limited access to decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court is another
arena in which the question of the relationship of openness to courts is contested. See 50
U.S.C. § 1803(c) (2012); N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 752 F.3d 123 (2d Cir.
2014) (holding that the government must disclose redacted documents concerning the
government’s legal analysis of drone strikes, in response to a FOIA request). As of June
2015, seventy opinions of the FISA court had become public, some through leaks. See NSA
Documents: FISA Court Orders/Opinions, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, https://www.aclu
.org/nsa-documents-search?f[0]=field__nsa_documents_type_of_doc%3A466 (last visited
June 22, 2015).
Members of Congress along with several commentators have argued that the failure to
publish FISA rulings is a source of the diminished confidence in that court. See, e.g., David
S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 209,
277 (2014); Alan Butler, Standing Up to Clapper: How to Increase Transparency and
Oversight of FISA Surveillance, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 55 (2013); Jillian Rayfield, Senators
Push Bill to Declassify FISA Court Rulings, SALON (June 11, 2013),
http://www.salon.com/2013/06/11/senators_push_bill_to_declassify_fisa_court_rulings/. In
2014, Senator Leahy joined several other co-sponsoring senators in seeking to revise the
procedures of the FISA Court. See S. 2685, 113th Cong. (2014).
179
See N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286, 290 (2d Cir.
2011).
180
Id.
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In order to attend, a prospective observer had, under Transit Authority
rules, to obtain permission from respondent-defendants; each respondent had to
agree, twice.181 The Transit Authority argued that requiring permission was
necessary to protect privacy and to avoid “chilling” individuals from requesting
hearings. The plaintiff, the New York Civil Liberties Union, argued that closure
prevented the public from obtaining necessary information about police
practices; for example, the Civil Liberties Union alleged that investigations into
the “demographic characteristics of those stopped and frisked by the New York
City Police Department officers on public transit” suggested that “minorities
receive[d] a disproportionate number of citations” for violating the rules.182 The
Second Circuit concluded under the “experience and logic” test that a qualified
First Amendment right of access existed.183 While bracketing the reach of its
ruling to other administrative proceedings, the Second Circuit held that the
NYCTA’s “ ‘quasi-judicial’ administrative proceedings” were so like criminal
trials that openness was obligatory.184
New York’s use of the NYCTA as a court aimed to dispose of a high
volume of low-level infractions. Closed procedures in the Delaware Chancery
Court had a different purpose; the Delaware legislature, worried about
maintaining the state’s “preeminence” in corporate dispute resolution, created a
special program in 2009 to attract high-end users.185 The legislature offered
what it called an “arbitration” program, run by the Chancery Court’s judges and
held in their courthouses; eligibility turned on at least one of the disputants
being incorporated in Delaware, one million dollars or more at stake, and the
parties’ willingness to pay $12,000 in filing fees and $6,000 daily thereafter.
Filings were not on the public docketing system, and the public was not
permitted to attend. The Chancery judges’ decisions were enforceable as
judgments, subject to review by the Delaware Supreme Court, which had not,
as of 2013, provided rules about whether any such appeals would be
confidential.186 Thus, unlike the “court-annexed arbitrations” in various state
and federal district courts, Delaware authorized courts-as-arbitration.
A group called the “Coalition for Open Government” argued that
Delaware’s legislation violated the First Amendment’s right of the public to
observe court proceedings; the lawsuit, Delaware Coalition for Open
181

Id. at 292.
Id. at 293.
183
Id. at 298–303 & n.9 (also noting that six Justices in Richmond Newspapers shared these
views on civil trial access rights).
184
Id. at 299–303.
185
H.R. 49, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West
Supp. 2015); DEL. CT. CH. R. 96–98.
186
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493, 503 (D. Del. 2012).; see
also Thomas J. Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or Closed Door
Litigation?: The Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349
(2013). He described confidentiality as the “most notable feature” of the Delaware program.
Id. at 354.
182
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Government, Inc. v. Strine, named Leo E. Strine, Jr., then the Chancellor of the
Delaware Court of Chancery, as the lead defendant. After a federal district
judge agreed that the program was “essentially a civil trial” that could not be
closed,187 Delaware’s Chancery Court judges appealed and lost again. The
Third Circuit concluded that “Delaware’s government-sponsored arbitration”
could not constitutionally be held in a courthouse and bar the public.188
In reaching that conclusion, Judge Dolores Sloviter, writing for the
majority, relied on the experience and logic test. Declining to accept at “face
value” the state’s designation of its program as an “arbitration,” the opinion
excavated the history of both arbitrations and trials.189 That account ran from
English common law trials in 1267 through the American Revolution to the
current time, as she documented that civil trials were—and are—public.190 The
question of public access to arbitration before the twentieth century was more
complex, as some proceedings were open.191 Closed arbitrations became
common after the advent of the 1920 New York arbitration law, the 1925
187

Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 502.
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 521 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied,
134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014).
189
Id. at 515–18.
190
See id. at 733 F.3d at 516. (“[E]vidence was delivered ‘in the open Court and in the
Presence of the Parties, their Attorneys, Council, and all By-standers, and before the Judge
and Jury . . . .’ ” (quoting Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068 (3d Cir.
1984))).
191
Id. at 517 (citing Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before
the American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 468 (1984)). Knowing the degree to which
arbitrations were open to third parties is impossible. Historians have identified examples in
which eighteenth and nineteenth century arbitrations were akin to trials, albeit without juries,
and many proceedings included spectators. See Mann, supra; see also AMALIA D. KESSLER,
INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGAL
CULTURE, 1800–1877 ch. 4 (forthcoming) (on file with author). Moreover, a rich history of
English arbitrations pre-Roman Britannia through the Elizabethan Age documents the
mélange of public and private that endowed third-party arbitrators with authority to resolve
disputes and public access to many of the proceedings. See DEREK ROEBUCK, EARLY
ENGLISH ARBITRATION (2008); DEREK ROEBUCK, THE GOLDEN AGE OF ARBITRATION:
DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER ELIZABETH I (2015). My thanks to John Langbein for
suggesting this resource.
Recent research on English and colonial practice also requires reassessing the view of
the role played by the judiciary in enforcing arbitration agreements in earlier centuries.
Under a 1698 statute, the British Parliament created a mechanism for parties to obtain
referrals to arbitration and for the court to enforce awards through contempt powers. This
approach was adopted in more than twenty American jurisdictions, including both before
and after colonies became states. James Oldham & Su Jin Kim, Arbitration in America: The
Early History, 31 L. & HIST. REV. 241, 246–51 (2013).
In contrast, by the time of the enactment of the federal legislation on arbitration in
1925, the argument for the statute was that courts did not enforce arbitration agreements.
Moreover, by then, arbitrations were styled as closed processes, and since its founding in
1926, the AAA has described privacy as a central feature of arbitrations. See FRANCES
KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND ACHIEVEMENTS 72, 88
(1948).
188
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United States Arbitration Act (later named the Federal Arbitration Act192), and
the growth of the market for arbitrators.193
Given the historical divergence between trial and arbitration, a key to the
majority decision was to categorize what Delaware judges were doing as
trials.194 “Delaware’s proceedings are conducted by Chancery Court judges, in
Chancery Court during ordinary court hours, and yield judgments that are
enforceable in the same way as judgments resulting from ordinary Chancery
Court proceedings. Delaware’s proceedings derive a great deal of legitimacy
and authority from the state.”195 As the concurring opinion by Judge Julio
Fuentes put it, “the air of [an] official State-run proceeding” made the limit on
public access unconstitutional.196
In terms of the “logic” of privacy, the majority underscored the benefits to
the public of knowing how “Delaware resolves major business disputes.”197
The court discounted arguments about the harms that public access would
cause, in part by noting that other methods existed to enable businesses to
protect their trade secrets and by arguing that even if court-based “arbitration”
was public, it would continue to offer flexibility and informality.198 In the end,
public “faith in the Delaware judicial system” was the more weighty
consideration in deciding the “First Amendment right of access to Delaware’s
government-sponsored arbitrations.”199
A competing application of the experience/logic test came from the dissent,
written by Judge Jane Roth;200 that approach illustrates the ways in which the
192

In 1947, Congress repealed the United States Arbitration Act and enacted a revised
version, entitled the Federal Arbitration Act. See Pub. L. No. 80-282, 61 Stat. 669 (1947).
193
The presumption of contemporary arbitration as confidential is central to the discussion
in both the majority and the dissent in Strine, 733 F.3d at 517–18; id. at 524–26 (Roth, J.,
dissenting).
194
Strine, 733 F.3d at 518 (“Proceedings in front of judges in courthouses have been
presumptively open to the public for centuries.”).
195
Id. at 520.
196
See id. at 522–23 (Fuentes, J., concurring).
197
Id. at 519 (majority opinion).
198
Id. at 519–521.
199
Id. at 521.
200
See id. at 523 (Roth, J., dissenting). Her views were reiterated forcefully in a petition for
certiorari that, despite the support of a host of amicus law firms and institutions, was denied
in the winter of 2014. See Strine Petition for Certiorari, supra note 164. Amici included the
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Roundtable, TechNet, a large group of law firms,
and NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc. and NYSE Euronext. See Brief of the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States of America and Business Roundtable as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners, Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1551 (2014) (No.
13-869), 2014 WL 709719 [hereinafter Strine Chamber Brief]; Brief for TechNet as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 709721 [hereinafter Strine
TechNet Brief]; Brief for Law Firms as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Strine, 134
S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 768323 [hereinafter Strine Law Firms Brief]; Brief of NASDAQ
OMX Group, Inc. and NYSE Euronext as Amici Curiae in Support of Granting the Petition,
Strine, 134 S. Ct. 1551, 2014 WL 787212 [hereinafter Strine NASDAQ Brief].
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current constitutional doctrine permits widely varying assessments of the
history and values at stake.201 The dissent focused on the centrality of privacy,
insulating both the process and the outcomes of arbitrations from public
scrutiny.202 In the dissent’s account, confidentiality was “one of the primary
reasons why litigants choose arbitration.”203 What the dissent described is what
economists call the potential “wealth effects,” as management may be
concerned about the impact on valuation of a corporation when knowledge of
its conflicts become public, and shareholders, the government, and consumers
react to claims made in litigation.204 In addition to protecting corporations from
adverse publicity, the dissent also argued for the desirability of closure, in that
excluding outsiders would ensure a collegial setting, conducive to producing
resolutions.205
Moving from the participants’ interest in closure to that of the state, Judge
Roth explained why closure had a “logic” from the state’s vantage point. Given
that leading purveyors of ADR offered confidentiality,206 Delaware could be at
a competitive disadvantage, as it needed to attract business to its courts so as to

201

Further, the concurring opinion by Judge Fuentes insisted that the court had not
expressed views on the “constitutionality of a law that may allow sitting Judges to conduct
private arbitrations if the system set up by such a law varies in certain respects” (unspecified
in his opinion) from what Delaware had provided. Strine, 733 F.3d at 523 (Fuentes, J.,
concurring).
202
Id. at 524–26 (Roth, J., dissenting). As Judge Roth explained, because the concurring
opinion by Judge Fuentes otherwise would have upheld judges functioning as arbitrators and
rested his objection on the unconstitutionality of confidentiality, her dissent focused on
where she departed from his concurrence. Id. at 525.
203
Id. at 525.
204
See Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, in 2
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 945, 961–66 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007).
205
See Strine, 733 F.3d at 525 (Roth, J., dissenting).
206
Id. at 525–26; see, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, R25 (2013) (explaining that “[t]he arbitrator and the AAA shall maintain the privacy of the
hearings,” and that the arbitrators shall have the power to exclude anyone who is not
“essential” to the proceedings); NAT’L CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM.
ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL: STATEMENT OF
PRINCIPLES, principle 12(2) (1998), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=
ADRSTG_005014; Rules of Conditionally Binding Arbitration, Rule 31: Confidentiality of
Records,
BETTER
BUS.
BUREAU,
https://www.bbb.org/council/programs-services
/dispute-handling-and-resolution/dispute-resolution-rules-and-brochures/rules-of-con
ditionally-binding-arbitration/#ConfidentialityofRecords (last visited June 30, 2015) (“It is
our policy that records of the dispute resolution process are private and confidential.”);
JAMS Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures, Rule 26, Confidentiality and
Privacy, JAMS (July 1, 2014), http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-comprehensive-arbitration
/#Rule%2026 (limiting public access to proceedings before the Judicial Arbitration and
Management Services). But see Pokorny v. Quiztar, Inc., 601 F.3d 987, 996–1002 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding unenforceable ADR provisions including confidentiality that created onesided advantages).
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maintain its “prestige and goodwill.”207 Because parties volunteered for the
program, the dissent saw the judicial power as derivative of the parties, rather
than the state;208 parties’ consent to the process was another reason why no
constitutional impediment existed to the closure. In short, the dissent’s
approach mixed empirical claims about what prospective users would do (“go
elsewhere” if Delaware’s proceedings were not closed) and normative views of
the importance of states being able to compete successfully in the marketplace
of dispute resolution by offering what the private sector proffered—privacy—
as a selling point for the court-based procedure as well.209
Another facet of the state’s efforts to gain a competitive edge was not
mentioned by any of the three opinions: Delaware was offering below-market
prices. Private arbitrators often charge fees significantly in excess of the $6,000
per day for which Delaware was renting the expertise and status provided by its
judges and courthouses.210 Through that pricing, the state both hoped to put its
judges on the global stage, poised to attract business, and to enable the state to
attract more corporations to pay charter fees (of hundreds of thousands of
dollars, in some instances) to incorporate in Delaware so as to be eligible to use
its court-based program.211 Moreover, as Professor Tom Stipanowich has noted,
judges had a personal reason to promote the program. They could use their
experience as a “sterling entrée into a post-judicial career as an arbitrator and
mediator—the retirement plan du jour for American judges.”212
Although the 2013 decision—and the Supreme Court’s decision not to
grant review in 2014—stopped the Delaware confidential arbitrations, the
pressures to use that model have not abated. Professor Stipanowich explained
that the “impetus” for Delaware’s efforts213—the volume of litigation, delays in
some courts, and public discovery rights—continues. Yet, while looking for

207
Strine, 733 F.3d at 519. The dissent did not offer an argument that my colleague, Roberta
Romano, suggested: that if more cases were decided by Delaware’s judges than by private
arbitrators, Delaware could protect the application and integrity of its law through having its
judges be the repeated sources of its application—albeit in private. Professor Romano also
noted that corporations were more likely to select venues for incorporation because of
substantive legal obligations than for this form of a procedural opportunity. See generally
Roberta Romano, The Market for Corporate Law Redux, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS (Francesco Parisi, ed., forthcoming 2015).
208
Strine, 733 F.3d at 525, n.4 (Roth, J., dissenting).
209
Id. at 526.
210
Judge Roth’s opinion could also have drawn on a range of lower court decisions
permitting closures in other contexts. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308
F. 3d 198 (3d. Cir. 2002) (upholding closing of deportation hearings out of concerns about
national security).
211
Stipanowich, supra note 186, at 350–57.
212
Id. at 350.
213
Id. at 351–52.
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alternatives, private arbitration outside of courts has not provided the kind of
control and discipline that some businesses seek when facing disputes.214
Thus, as one amicus had argued to the Third Circuit, as it urged the
appellate court to overturn the district court’s invalidation of the court-based
closed proceedings, businesses were “weary of private arbitration” and sought
“predictability” by turning to the Chancery judges.215 As Professor Stipanowich
put it, Delaware’s judges were “first-rate adjudicator[s],” schooled in the state’s
law, well known for their “efficient case management” (with rules setting forth
times for hearings within three months of filing). Further, unlike arbitrators
paid by the day, the fees went to the state and therefore created no incentives
for the Delaware judges to permit arbitrations to proceed slowly.216 In other
words, the “faith in the Delaware Judicial System” that Judge Sloviter
described in Strine to be at risk by closure217 was the very attribute that these
disputants wanted, albeit outside the purview of the public.
One response to the interest in judicial oversight would be to draft
arbitration contracts that include the opportunity for either party to go to court
to obtain review of the merits. But in 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected
contractual provisions seeking to do so; the Court refused to interpret the
Federal Arbitration Act to permit court review as consistent with the grounds
authorized by the statute for the vacature of awards, and the Court declined to
permit parties, under federal law, to expand the bases of courts’ jurisdiction to
review arbitrations beyond those specified in the statute.218
Yet market pressures for court-based closed proceedings have not abated.
After the Third Circuit held the Delaware program unconstitutional, the judges
petitioned for certiorari, and they were joined by several amici briefs in seeking
to overturn the lower courts. The filings repeatedly extolled the value of
confidentiality. Twenty-three law firms “from throughout the [n]ation” insisted
on the importance of “confidentiality, flexible procedures, and access to
214

Id. at 353 (citing a survey he and others had done to evaluate perspectives by Fortune
1,000 corporations on ADR).
215
Strine TechNet Brief, supra note 200, at 10 (quoting Jessica Tyndall, The Delaware
Arbitration Experiment: Not Just a “Secret Court,” 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 395,
408 (2013)).
216
Stipanowich, supra note 186, at 350, 356. He was critical of the Delaware program and
supportive of the ruling finding it unconstitutional. Id. at 351.
217
Strine, 733 F.3d at 521.
218
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008). Yet the majority added the
caveat that parties could provide for “enforcement under state statutory or common law, . . .
where judicial review of different scope is arguable.” Id. at 590. As a consequence, a few
state courts have read Hall Street to permit them the un-preempted leeway to accord review
(as a matter of state “procedure,” rather than arbitration’s “substance”) more expansive than
does the Federal Arbitration Act. See, e.g., Cable Connection Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.
3d 586, 594, 604–05 (Cal. 2008); Nafta Traders, Inc. v. Quinn, 339 S.W.3d 84, 93–94 (Tex.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 455 (2011). A few state courts have reached the opposite
conclusion. See, e.g., HL 1, LLC v. Riverwalk, LLC, 15 A.3d 725 (Me. 2011); Brookfield
Country Club, Inc. v. St. James-Brookfield, LLC, 696 S.E.2d 663 (Ga. 2011).
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arbitrators with expertise in Delaware corporate law.”219 The Chamber of
Commerce and the Business Roundtable added that closure was “of great
importance to the nation’s business community.”220 Echoing Judge Roth’s
dissent in Strine, the Chamber asserted that “businesses, like anyone else, will
rarely agree to arbitrate without the assurance of confidentiality.”221 “[O]pen
proceedings” were “incompatible” with commercial arbitration.222 As another
amicus put it, the point was to avoid the “reputational damage that could flow
from highly adversarial and public disputes.”223 Further, an amicus filing by
TechNet, a group of technology and venture capital companies, linked
Delaware’s program to “America’s global leadership in technology and
innovation.”224
One amicus pointed to another program that Delaware had pioneered in
2003, seeking to attract “technology disputes” to its Chancery courts. That
statute, providing a confidential mediation petitioning process, was promoted
by Leo Strine who, when Vice Chancellor, sought legislation to enable
“mediation-only filings” so that disputants could enlist judges as mediators.
Going to a courthouse impressed upon the parties the “dignity and importance”
of the process. His view was that the state should offer judges to “businesses
hoping to achieve a just settlement without making their dispute public.”225
The program, as enacted, requires that potential disputants have more than
a million dollars at stake, that the parties consent to Delaware’s jurisdiction,
and that at least one party be a business entity formed or organized under
Delaware law or having is principal place of business in Delaware.226
Disputants can then file a confidential petition “not of public record” to specify
the issues to be mediated. Chancery judges or masters are authorized to serve as

219

Strine Law Firms Brief, supra note 200, at 1–2.
Strine Chamber Brief, supra note 200, at 2. In addition, NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc., the
“principle stock exchange operators” in the United States also filed in support of overturning
the Third Circuit. See Strine NASDAQ Brief, supra note 200.
221
Strine Chamber Brief, supra note 200, at 4–5.
222
Id. at 12.
223
Strine NASDAQ Brief, supra note 200, at 3; see Romano, supra note 207.
224
Strine TechNet Brief, supra note 200, at 1 (explaining that it was “an association of the
chief executive officers and senior executives of the Nation’s leading technology
companies” in technology, e-commerce, venture capital, and other fields, and the group of
businesses employed more than two million people and had revenue in excess of $800
billion). TechNet argued that the Third Circuit’s decision was both a “novel” constitutional
holding and in conflict with the Supreme Court’s expansion of the reach of mandates to
arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 3–4; see also, e.g., CompuCredit Corp. v.
Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011).
225
Leo E. Strine, Jr., “Mediation-Only” Filings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Can
New Value Be Added by One of America’s Business Courts?, 53 DUKE L.J. 585, 592–94
(2003).
226
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 347(a) (West 2006).
220
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mediators—at $10,000 for the first day and $5,000 for every day thereafter.227
In other words, in addition to the procedure struck in Strine, Delaware currently
has another path for certain disputants to obtain private access to its courts and
its judges.
The question is whether this program, if challenged, would be found
constitutional. Can documents, styled “mediation petitions” be filed in court but
closed to the public? The case law to date on public access to court filings has
focused on whether the materials are “judicial documents” related to litigation;
some circuits permit more access to documents than do others.228 How would
one characterize Delaware’s “mediation petitions”? Defenders of keeping
confidential the documents requesting Delaware’s judge-mediators to
participate in a process in which neither the filings nor the activities were “of
public record” would argue that such petitions—and the process that results—
aim to avoid, rather than be part of, litigation. Thus, this new procedure
provides another example of the questions that lace this essay—about the
relationship of alternative processes in courts related to commitments that
courts be open and public venues.
Delaware’s mediation procedures reflect and then seek to deflect these
questions by both creating a confidential filing system and specifying a method
of “protecting public access to the Courts.”229 The rules provide that, when
confidentiality is asserted to seal documents, those seeking to seal have to
provide a “public version” of the confidential filing; when filing “a complaint
confidentially,” plaintiffs have to make their “best efforts” to give notice to
each person with an interest and to provide a proposed public version of the
complaint. How such “best efforts” can be policed is a question. The rules
authorize the public or the press to challenge the closure,230 but such third
parties would need to be informed about the pending matter by those seeking

227

See id.; DEL. CT. CH. R. 94(a)(4) (providing “confidential and not of public record”
proceedings); id. R. 95(b) (outlining the details of mediation conference confidentiality);
COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DEL., MEDIATION GUIDELINE PAMPHLET 3 (Apr. 2011)
(explaining that the fees are divided “equally among the parties”); see also Strine TechNet
Brief, supra note 200, at 6–7 (citing this procedure in use since 2003).
228
Compare United States v. Erie Cnty., 763 F.3d 235 (2d Cir. 2014), with IDT Corp. v.
eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1224 n.1 (8th Cir. 2013).
A related set of questions are about the transparency of non-Article III courts in the
federal system, and access to their filings and procedures. See, e.g., Ballard v. Comm’r, 544
U.S. 40 (2005) (holding inappropriate the Tax Court’s practice of making the reports of its
special judges confidential). See generally Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal to
Make the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195 (2008).
229
See Protecting Public Access to the Courts: Chancery Rule 5.1, DEL. ST. CTS.,
http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/ChanceryMemorandumRule5-1.pdf (last visited June 30,
2015).
230
See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Amendment to Court of Chancery Rules to Delete Rule 5(g)
and Adopt Rule 5.1 (Nov. 5, 2012), available at http://courts.delaware.gov/rules
/ChanceryAmendmentRules5-1.pdf.
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the confidential process. Moreover, the rules do not explain whether and how
courts are to review whatever efforts are undertaken to provide notice.231
One might want to cabin Delaware as an outlier, famously focused on
corporations and, in these proceedings, seeking large-value disputes in part as a
way of attracting businesses to incorporate in Delaware and pay the significant
required fees to do so. Yet even if the sums involved are unusual, the state’s
programs are not idiosyncratic. Rather, they are variations on what I have
documented is occurring in courthouses around the country, as court rules have
effectively moved the public out of the process in tens of thousands of ordinary
cases. As my account of local rules, databases, and overviews of ADR has
detailed, the practice is increasingly becoming to provide privacy, not publicity.
In mediation, other forms of evaluations, and in settlement conferences,
whether run by judges or their designated “neutrals,” the interactions are
confidential.
The rules surrounding court-annexed arbitrations offer, as discussed,
another approach. In the high-volume jurisdictions in which court-annexed
arbitration functions as a kind of quick trial before appointed lawyers in lieu of
judges, the practice has been to provide for these proceedings to be held in
courtrooms and to permit the public to attend.232 Other jurisdictions close their
court-annexed arbitrations. Indeed, some of those private court-based
proceedings served as examples proffered by advocates arguing the legality of
closure in the briefing in Strine but were not relied upon by any of the three
appellate opinions.233
Reflection is therefore in order about the tensions between the case law on
First Amendment public access rights and the ADR rules. The decisions on jury
charges, Guantánamo Bay, the New York City Transit Authority, and
Delaware’s Chancery Court illustrate judicial resistance to closing off public
access for court-based, trial-like, and trial-related proceedings. Further, the
Strine decision refused to turn sitting judges into arbitrators—a view shared in
the small number of reported decisions in which state or federal judges served
as arbitrators.234 One could build on this case law to argue that court-annexed
arbitrations must, as of right, be open, and then mount challenges in those
231

Cf. Protecting Public Access to the Courts: Chancery Rule 5.1, supra note 229, at 6.
See supra note 135.
233
In the briefing before the Third Circuit, the confidentiality of court-based ADR
programs, including arbitration, was argued. See Brief for Appellee at 10, Del. Coal. for
Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No. 12-3859), 2013 WL
100597; Stipanowich, supra note 186, at 365.
234
See DDI Seamless Cylinder Int’l, Inc. v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 14 F.3d 1163
(7th Cir. 1994) (“General Fire is correct that arbitration is not in the job description of a
federal judge, including (see 28 U.S.C. § 636) a magistrate judge.”); Ovadiah v. New York
Ass’n for New Americans, No. 95 Civ 10523, 1997 WL 342411, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 23,
1997) (“Nevertheless, as noted in DDI Seamless, there is inherent difficulty in and serious
potential problems with having judicial officers step out of their traditional adjudicatory
functions. Arbitrations by magistrate judges should be avoided.”).
232
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jurisdictions where that form of ADR is closed. That claim would be relatively
straightforward, in that court-annexed arbitrations are trial-like, and the lawyers
conducting the proceedings are subjected to disqualification and accorded
immunity as judges would have. Moreover, in terms of experience and logic,
the track record of jurisdictions providing open arbitration offers a counter to
arguments that closure is required for arbitration to succeed.235
Yet, even if Delaware’s court-annexed arbitration and other jurisdictions’
offering of this process to ordinary litigants are easy cases when contrasted
with mediation and settlements, the split Third Circuit decision illustrates that
public access is not secure for ADR’s most trial-like version. Moreover, the
acculturation of judges to various forms of ADR that entail privatized
procedure makes more likely the acceptance, as logical, of a variety of ways in
which the public can be excluded. Further, for the formalists, reluctant to rely
on law’s evolution, all the ADR variations fall outside what was open when the
constitutional guarantees about public courts were adopted.
In addition to the limits of historical analogies and the slippery slope of
becoming accustomed to closed proceedings in court, the “logic” of most forms
of ADR is that private accommodation is preferable to third-party resolutions;
hence, judges ought to promote parties’ withdrawal from the public purview in
service of public and private ends—the efficient resolutions of disputes. With
assumptions that consent is an unproblematic preference to be honored, that
costs are saved, and that the state’s role is policed through rules organizing
ADR, no third-party oversight to validate legitimacy is required.
In short, the test of experience and logic is not the equivalent of a norm that
access to court-based decision making is required in democracies. But here, as
part of a larger project addressing the impact of new procedural forms, I argue
for shaping First Amendment doctrine in light of commitments that courts
function as open, egalitarian venues. Even if the parties, judges, and other
neutrals believe in the benefits of closure, and even when parties consent, court
promotion of ADR, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, ought to be
accompanied by public accountings of what transpires. The reasons stem from
Judge Fuentes’s description of what was objectionable in the Delaware
program—that it had “the air of [an] official State-run proceeding.”236 His
insight merits expansion, for the presence of the state infuses all these forms of
ADR, which are mandated, advocated, and structured through hundreds of
court rules, government manuals, and websites, and are commended to litigants
by judges.
The result of these many new rules is not “bargaining in the shadow of the
law,” but bargaining as a requirement of the law. The dispatchers are the
235

In the context of the federal system, federal judges doing so would either interpret the
statute or local rule mandating confidentiality of ADR procedures as not addressing courtannexed arbitration or hold it unconstitutional as applied to this genre of ADR.
236
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 522 (3d Cir. 2013) (Fuentes, J.,
concurring).
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judges, who have either designated themselves as “neutrals” or appointed
others and cloaked them in “quasi-judicial” authority, complete with
immunities from suit and obligations of disqualification akin to that of judges.
In some instances, as the certiorari petition on behalf of the Delaware judges
explained, “active” or “senior judges” conduct “binding, confidential
arbitrations in state courthouses.”237 In other instances, lawyers do so at judges’
behest. The point of structuring these procedures in courts is that, as both the
Delaware judges and their supporters in seeking confidentiality explain, going
to court “forces parties to comport themselves civilly, to assess their positions
soberly, and to present their cases in a way that respects the other demands on
the judge’s time.”238
When courts offer such important civic moments, they should not be
permitted, as a matter of constitutional law, to exclude the public, which has a
right to see first-hand how conflicts in democracies can be handled, or to learn
that judges and litigants fail to live up to obligations of fair, even-handed
treatment and civil exchanges about deeply disputed views of fact and of law.
As procedure is increasingly becoming contract, state-promoted contracting—
produced at the behest of the state and shaped through judicial intervention—
needs regulation through public oversight and participation.
To date, the First Amendment access doctrine has focused on whether
proceedings in court are trial-like, or predicates to trials. What the doctrine
needs to take into account is that the touchstone of being trial-like is no longer
a measure of what judges do in courts.239 Whether on trial, on the bench, or in
less formal settings, judges in courts wield significant power, and many of the
rationales supporting access explained.
The issue is which activities ought to have what Justice Brennan termed the
“public character of judicial proceedings.”240 A return to the explanations for
access in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers is thus in order. The context was a
closed criminal proceeding, and in finding the blanket closure unconstitutional,
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the plurality, spoke about the “nexus between
openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness.”241 He commented further
that “[p]eople in an open society do not demand infallibility from their
institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from
observing.”242 The plurality opinion relied on the First Amendment as
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implicitly guaranteeing access to criminal trials—prompting Justice Stevens to
describe the case as a “watershed” for recognizing constitutional protection of
“the acquisition of newsworthy matter.”243 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, focused on how the holding supported the “right to gather
information.”244
The question in that case and at that time was the role played by trials. The
question of our time is what in courts ought to be made public in the absence of
trials. When, to borrow again from Judge Fuentes, does a process gain “the air
of [an] official State-run proceeding”?245 Answers come from the reconfigured
work of judges. When they convene meetings in courts, when they take on the
role of “neutrals” or authorize others to do so with “quasi-judicial” status, their
decisions and their procedures are the state, in action. As more of the activity of
“the judicial” moves to become “quasi-judicial,” the public needs to be built in,
so as to be able to be present at least some aspects of the proceedings and to
know the results.
A brief note on the practical implications is in order. Implementation of
this obligation can be modeled after what takes place in the criminal context,
just as the law on access to civil litigation regularly draws upon criminal
analogues. In criminal cases, the law requires (albeit with uneven
implementation) that the sequence of proceedings from arraignment and bail to
trials or guilty pleas take place in public.246 While bargaining itself is generally
off the record, the formal charges leveled against a defendant ex ante and the
outcomes ex post are on the record. Further, constitutional law requires that
before judges accept criminal defendants’ pleas, judges must inform defendants
of the alternatives and of the consequences.247 Moreover, before a defendant
can be sentenced, federal judges must “address themselves to the defendant”
and provide a “personal invitation” for the defendant to speak before
sentencing.248 In addition, given the potential for claims of ineffective
assistance during plea bargaining,249 both judges and lawyers have incentives to
document offers and acceptances by putting them on the record.
The guilty plea model is far from ideal. The recitation of rights to trial and
the inquiries on waiver are formulaic, and many defendants do not perceive
themselves as having, and do not have, options—in light of the power of
prosecutors. Yet the public exchanges at pleas and sentencing create knowledge
243

Id. at 582 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 586.
245
Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc. v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 523 (3d Cir. 2013) (Fuentes, J.,
concurring).
246
Simonson, supra note 56, at 2216.
247
McCarthy v. United States 394 U.S. 459 (1969); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356
(2010). Prosecutors are not, however, always held to the agreements they proposed. See
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009).
248
United States v. Paladino, 769 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2014).
249
See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
244

1686

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:1631

of the decisions made and their consequences. The role of the judge is
identified, and the actions taken are sometimes revised through subsequent
proceedings.
Thus, the constitutional mandates of rights of audience ought to be
understood as entailing the political obligation that democratic orders subject
government authority to public oversight, in both criminal and civil contexts.
That obligation exists whether courts exercise that power through presiding at
hearings and trials, imposing judgments. or through the promotion of private
resolutions of claims brought to court.
The alternative—the ADR in the making—is a privatized system of courtbased dispute resolution. Instead of functioning as contributors to the public
sphere, courts shelter private exchanges that offer no forms of constraints on
power or validation aside from participants’ reports of satisfaction. Gone are
what Jeremy Bentham called “auditors,”250 for no one can assess the
interactions between the decision-makers and the disputants and evaluate how
resources affect outcomes, whether similarly-situated litigants are treated
comparably, the impact of repeat players, and whether one would want to get
into (or avoid) court. No outsider can gain “assurance that established
procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known.”251
Instead, control over the meanings of the claims made and the judgments
rendered rests with the parties, oftentimes bound by confidentiality agreements
about both processes and outcomes.
To conclude, having accepted Professor Subrin’s invitation to be “thinking
about . . . a country’s procedure,”252 I find myself mapping the deterioration of
the democratic features that Professor Subrin outlined. As ADR processes
come to dominate court-based dispute resolution, the power exercised by the
state in civil proceedings retreats from the public purview, in a fashion
paralleling the movement that Foucault traced in the shift away from public
displays of state punishment and to closed prisons. We are watching (a word
chosen deliberately) the dismembering of the procedural adjudicatory system
shaped during the last century, when courts widened their doors to include all
persons in the social ordering253 and to give them power through juridical
opportunities to make claims in public. The new court-based ADR procedures
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build in no external vantage point from which to assess the exchanges taking
place under their rules and the kinds of outcomes reached. Debates about
underlying obligations, the scope of remedies, and the role of the state are
silenced.
The foundation of the authority of judges is that their power to impose
judgment comes from the structure of adjudication, its constraints, and its
public character. Courts cannot shed their regulatory functions and remain
robust institutions of authority. If the task of adjudication is replaced with that
of shepherding parties toward private conciliation, the independence of judges
becomes a goal without a purpose or a constraint. The result is the decline of
adjudication’s potential to serve and to support democracies.
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